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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often 
deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the 
observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these 
modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the 
rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general the~ry that takes 
account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central 
principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are 
evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their 
decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game 
theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive 
weights. 
The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and 
the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model 
and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. 
In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice 
equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary 
contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is 
estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the 
voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data 
better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R 2 
analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the 
one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study. 
v 
The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, 
computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from 
the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model 
outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. 
However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated 
rule-of-thumb, called the SOP AM, offers the best explanation of the data. 
vi 
Table Of Contents 
Chapter 1 : Introduction ....... .... ...... .......... .......... ..... ......... ....... .... ....... .. ........... .. 1 
Chapter 2: The Rational Novice Behavior ....... .. ... ... ......... ......... ............. ........ .. 6 
2. I The Basic Framework of the Behavioral Model .... ........ .......... ........ 7 
2.2 Comments and Discussion .. ........ .......................... ................. .... ..... 9 
Chapter 3: Aggregate Behavior and the Rational Novice Equilibrium .......... ..... II 
3.1 An Overview ............. ..... ............... ..................... .. ..... ............. ..... ... 11 
3.2 Theoretical Properties of the Rational Novice Equilibrium ........... ... 14 
Chapter 4 : The Voluntary Contribution Game .. ....... ..... ................ ..... ..... .......... 25 
4.1 Overview ... ... ..................................... .... .... ............ .......... ... ............ 25 
4.2 The Behavior Model of the Voluntary Contribution Game ......... .. ... 26 
4.3 Rational Novice Equilibrium of the Voluntary Contribution 
Game ...................... .............. ...... .... ......... .. ..... ........ ........ .. ...... .... ..... ... . 31 
4.4 Data Analysis : Techniques and A Description of the Data ....... .. ... .. 33 
4.5 Data Analysis : Results .............. ... .... .... .... ........ ......... .... .... ... .... ..... . 38 
4.6 Comments and Discussions .................... .......... ........... ........ ...... .... .. 40 
Chapter 5 : First Price Sealed Bid Private Value Auctions ... ......................... ..... 43 
5.1 Overview .. ...... ............. ............... ...... ..................................... .. .... ... 43 
5.2 First Price Sealed Bid Auction ... ........ .... ........... ............ ........ ....... ... 45 
5.2.1 Nash Equilibria .............. ........................................ ... ... ... ............ . 46 
5.3 The Rational Novice Equilibrium ........... ......................... .. ... ...... .... . 47 
5.3.1 The Rational Novice Model ............... .. .... ..... .... .. ..... ........ ....... ... .. 47 
5.3.2 Rational novice Behavior in First Price Sealed Bid Auctions ... ... 50 
5.3.3 Comparative Statics ... ....... ...... .. .. .... .................. .... .. ......... .... ....... . 53 
5.3.3.1 Bid Spread ............ ............................... ....... ...... ... .... ..... ..... ... .... 54 
vii 
5.3.3.2 Bids Submitted with Maximum Probability .. ... ..... ...... ...... ... ... ... . 56 
5.4 Numerical Analysis .. .. .... ...... .... ....... .... .... ......... .... .............. .......... ... 58 
5.5 Data Analysis: Techniques and A Description of the Data ........... .. .. 60 
5.6 Data Analysis: Results ..................... .... .... ........... ....... ..... ....... .... ..... 66 
5.7 Summary and Comments ... ..... ... ..... ........... ....................... ...... ........ 70 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often do not 
behave according to game theory. Some examples of such evidence can be found in 
centipede game experiments 1, voluntary contribution game experiments2 and experiments 
with a version of the chain store paradox3. In the first price auction experiments, although 
game theory predicts behavior that is close to the data, the statistical variations in the data 
cannot be reconciled with the theory. The evidence against game theory is particularly 
strong in the centipede game and the voluntary contribution game because the subjects 
have been found to deviate even from dominant strategies. 
Another example can be found in the studies of first price auctions. Although all 
these studies show that Nash equilibrium models usually offer good fits to individual bids, 
deviations were always observed. The bids usually spread over a range that roughly 
centers at the Nash equilibrium. Nash models failed to explain the bid spread. Usually the 
statistical model used to fit the data is nothing more than the Nash equilibrium bidding 
function with an ad hoc random variable added. The reason that Nash models are 
incapable of explaining the bid spread is that all agents are assumed to be rational. As a 
result, the agents are required to follow very restrictive equilibrium strategy profiles that 
are the solution of complex mathematical problems. 
Palfrey and McKelvey in "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game" suggest 
that imperfect agents may be the answer. They developed a model which assumes there is 
a mixture of rational and irrational agents. The irrational agents play a fixed non-optimal 
1 See Palfrey and Mckelvey, "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game". 
2See Palfrey and Prisbrey, "Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How much and 
Why?" 
3See Schmidt, "Reputation Building By Error Prone Agents" 
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strategy. The rational agents adjust their strategies given the probability of encountering 
an irrational agent. In a number of similar studies, people are indeed found to be imperfect 
as oppose to exhibit the kind of perfect rationality defined in game theory. Subjects behave 
as if they were trying to play optimal strategies but they were not sure where the optimum 
was. 
My goal is to develop a theory that can provide a coherent explanation of non 
game theoretic behavior across different economic environments. Irrationality will be 
modeled at a fundamental level. A new model, which is called the rational novice model. is 
introduced as an alternative approach to game theory modeling. It is not only able to 
explain deviations from game theoretic models, but is also able to provide quantitative 
predictions of the distribution of these deviations. 
The rational novice model is based on two ideas. The central idea of the rational 
novice model is that people systematically produce inaccurate guesses when they are 
evaluating their options in a game-like situation. This fact is common knowledge and 
people respond to it. The second idea is that people approach their decisions as if they are 
solving portfolio problems. This is different from the traditional game theory in which 
agents try to find optimal pure strategies. Instead, each agent considers a portfolio of 
strategies and determines the exact fraction of the times each strategies being played. This 
idea of a portfolio of strategies is also different from that of mixed strategies in which 
strategies are played randomly. One of the consequences is that risk averse people hedge 
their actions to reduce the risks associated with making incorrect evaluations. Thus, there 
is no single "optimal" strategy. 
This model will be different from the Palfrey and McKelvey's centipede model in 
two important aspects. First, there will be no distinction between rational and irrational 
3 
agents. All agents are assumed to be rational and irrational at the same time. Irrationality is 
modeled by introducing noisy signals into the agents' decision making mechanisms. 
Furthermore, while Palfrey and McKelvey's definition of an imperfect agent is game 
specific, this model provides a general theoretical framework of imperfection which can be 
applied to any environment. 
Another approach is to model agents as rational decision-makers with imperfect 
information. Harsanyi ( 1973) introduced a game theory model in which the payoff matrix 
is uncertain. McKelvey and Palfrey (1994) introduced a similar model called the quanta} 
choice model. In the quanta} choice model, each agent observes an erroneous payoff 
vector. Then each agent chooses a strategy that maximizes the observed payoff. The 
Quanta! Response Equilibrium (QRE) is then defined as a fixed point of this process. 
Given the statistical nature of the observed payoff vectors, the QRE puts positive 
probabilities not only on best responses. 
The Harsanyi setup and the quanta} choice model can be interpreted as a special 
case of the rational novice model. In all three models, agents observe erroneous payoffs. 
The agents in the quanta! choice model accept the observed payoffs as their real payoffs. 
On the other hand, the rational novice model assumes the agents understand that they are 
erroneous in calculating their payoffs and that they try to respond to it. They respond by 
treating their problem as a portfolio problem. The agents who do not care about errors 
(risk neutral agents) will be playing quanta) responses. Thus, the quanta! choice model is a 
special case of the rational novice model when everyone is risk neutral. 
Rosenthal (1989) has also developed a model of agents with bounded rationality. 
Rosenthal assumes that the probability of playing any strategy is linear in the payoff. Thus, 
inferior strategies will still be played, but with smaller probabilities. The rational novice 
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model is considerably different from the Rosenthal. The rational novice model bases the 
subjects' behavior on a maximization principle instead of an assumed response function. 
The advantage of the rational novice model can be seen when applied to the first 
price auctions. In previous studies, statistical models were constructed by adding an ad 
hoc nuisance random variable to the Nash model. The rational novice model does not 
require such construction. Furthermore, the statistical variations in bids are natural 
consequences of the rational novice model. 
This theory assumes a totally different level of rationality from the traditional game 
theory. Nash models assume agents have preferences that can be describe mathematically. 
Actions are chosen to maximize preferences. Let us call this the first level of rationality. In 
the rational novice model, the agents are not able to fully deduce the solution to the 
maximization problem in the first level of rationality. They are only capable of arriving at 
noisy guesses. Assuming that the agents realize their imperfection, a second level of 
rationality is added to the model. In this second level of rationality, the agents choose a 
portfolio of actions to reduce the risks associated with making the wrong guess. 
The main goal of this study is to answer two questions. Is the rational novice 
model a plausible theory? Does the rational novice model offer a good explanation to 
experimental data? The first question can be answered by determining whether the rational 
novice model is consistent with intuition and whether it has desirable theoretical 
properties. The only counter intuitive element in the model is that it seems that the agents 
are required to solve a more complicated mathematical problem (in the second level of 
rationality) while they are assumed to be incapable to solving a simpler one (in the first 
level of rationality). However, as can be seen in the later chapters, though complicated, the 
portfolio problem is essentially the same across different applications. On the other hand, 
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each different situation requires a different maximization problem in the first level of 
rationality. It is plausible that people can learn the solution to the portfolio problem over 
time and over different circumstances. Moreover, even if the agents are not able to 
perfectly solve the portfolio problem, it does not invalidate this approach. Recall that the 
second level of rationality is the response to the inability of behaving perfectly in the first 
level of rationality . As the theory moves from the first to the second level of rationality, a 
wider range of phenomena is explained. There may be a third and a fourth level of 
rationality that may even do better. 
A number of theoretical properties are derived in chapter 3. The most important 
one is the existence of the equilibrium. It is also established that when the Nash 
equilibrium is a special case of the rational novice equilibrium when the errors are small. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are two applications of the rational novice model. In both the voluntary 
contribution game and the first price sealed bid auction, the rational novice model is 
shown to provide better explanations to experimental data than Nash models. 
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Chapter 2: The Rational Novice Behavior 
The rational novice model can be divided into two parts. The first part describes the 
behavior of a single agent. This chapter is devoted to describe the behavior model. 
The model is based on two central principles. The first principle is that when 
people are calculating the utilities associated with their available actions, they make 
independent errors in their calculations. These errors may come from the fact that people 
round off when they are making calculations. For lack of a better term, these errors are 
called internal errors to distinguish them from external errors that are deviations from 
optimal strategies. The second principle is that people consider portfolios of strategies 
instead of single strategies when they make their decisions. Risk averse people dislike the 
risk associated with internal errors and they diversify this risk away by playing a mixture of 
actions. These two ideas are best illustrated by a simple example. Consider an agent faced 
with a game against nature. Imagine there are two jars full of coins and the agent has to 
pick one out of the two. The jars are of different dimensions and shapes. Ideally the agent 
will count the number of coins in each jar and pick the one with more coins. However, if 
the agent is not allowed to count or he has to make the decision in a hurry, he has to make 
a rough guess of the number of coins in each jar. Furthermore, the agent is aware of the 
inaccuracy of his guesses. Now if the agent is to play this game ten times with identical 
jars which he cannot open until the end of the games and he is not sure which jar has more 
money, it is to his advantage to hedge his actions. That is, he may want to pick jar one 
seven times and jar two three times to hedge against the risks of wrong guesses. This 
scenario is also analogous to the stock market. Consider each jar as a stock. The 
diversification by picking a mixture of different jars is similar to the diversification of 
portfolios in the stock market. The difference between the rational novice model and the 
other models with imperfect agents is that in the rational novice model, agents do not only 
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react to other agents' imperfection. The agents are also reacting to their own imperfection 
by minimizing their external errors according to some relatively simple rules. 
2.1 The Basic Framework of the Behavioral Model 
The two basic principles are summarized in the following: 
The Basic Principles 
• The Principle of Imperfect Agents: Agents make internal errors when they evaluate 
their actions in a game. 
• The Principle of Multiple Strategies: Each agent chooses a portfolio (exact 
frequencies) of actions to play. 
The following is the formal model. Consider an agent faced with a game against nature. 
The game is repeated T times. Define: 
a) the set of actions, A={ a 1 ,a2 , ••• ,aM} 
b) the set of true values, v. e ~ for all a e A 
C) a VeCtOr Of beSt gueSSeS, g = {ga} aeA 
d) the error structure, 't:9tM ~ P(9tM) 
e) the conditional belief of the true value, P(vlg) 
f) strategy frequency profile, p = (p1, p2 , ••• , pM) e I::!..M 
g) the utility function, u:9t ~ 9t. 
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The following assumptions are made to facilitate the tractability of the model. These 
assumptions are independent of the two central principles. 
1) The agents do not discount 
2) Each agent is paired with a random set of opponents in each game. There are no 
reputation effects. 
3) Agents are risk averse and have concave utility functions u(). 
The two central principles can be formally defined as follows: 
• The Principle of Imperfect Agents 
In each period, if the agent takes the action a E A, he receives v • . (Consider each 
action as a jar and v. as the amount of money in jar a.) An imperfect agent makes errors in 
his evaluation. For each action a, the agent arrives at a best guess g • . The best guesses 
g = {g.} aeA are generated by a joint probability measure 't ( v ), which is a function of the 
true values v = { v a} aeA . The function 't: 9tM ~ P(9tM) is called the error structure. Given 
the best guesses g, the agent is assumed to have a belief P(vlg) about the probability 
measure of the true values v conditioned on the best guesses g . In our "pick the jar" 
example, the agent guesses there are I 0 coins in jar a. However, he is not sure and he has 
some beliefs about the probabilities of the cases where there are 9, 10 or 11 coins in the 
jar. 
• The Principle of Multiple Strategies: 
The agents do not discount and they care about the total sum of values in all the 
T 
periods, L v ••. If the agent is perfect, he makes his decision in the following manner. He 
l = l 
makes an evaluation of each feasible action and chooses the action which gives the highest 
v. and plays it through all T periods. 
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Since the agent does not discount, the total sum of values only depends on the 
frequencies of actions and not the exact sequence of the actions. Define the strategy 
frequency profile of the agent to be p = (p1, p2 , ... , pM) belonging to the simplex !:::.M .1 If 
the total number of games played is T, then the number of times action am is played is 
Tpm. (The agent is going to pick the jar, which is labeled by am, Tpm times.) The total 
T M 
value~ v,, can be written as T~pmv.m or Tp·v. 
t=l m=l 
Combining the two principles, the agent's preference can be represented by the following 
maximization problem : 
(2.1) M:X J u(Tp · v)dPCvlg) subject to p E t:::.M. 
2.2 Comments and Discussion 
This behavior model is similar to the ones that are used in the portfolio selection 
theories in the finance literature. Notice that in this model, the agents choose the 
frequencies of their actions. They are assumed to know exactly how often they play a 
certain action. It is also assumed that the sequences of their actions are randomized. For 
example, an agent may want to play action a 2 times and action b once. It is equally likely 
that he plays (a,a,b), (a,b,a) or (b,a,a). 
Since the agent chooses an action in each of the T games he plays, the only 
possible frequencies of each action are multiples of Iff. Therefore, although it is 
convenient to work with the continuous simplex !:::.M, the situation is better represented by 
the following maximization problem : 
1In actuality, the agents' can only choose between some points in the simplex. 
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M:X J u(Tp · v)dP(vjg) subject to p E ~~ , where ~~ is the T -discrete simplex 
defined by 
.<l~~{p ~ (p,.p, , ... ,p.+; E {H f} IIi and t. P; ~ 1} 
In a later section, it will be shown that when T gets large, the continuous formulation is a 
good approximation of the discrete one. 
II 
Chapter 3: Aggregate Behavior and the Rational Novice Equilibrium 
3.1 An Overview 
The previous chapter describes a model of behavior of an agent faced with a game against 
nature. This section extends the model to multi-player games. The central theme of the 
rational novice model of multi-player games is the concept of the rational novice 
equilibrium, which is a departure from the traditional game theoretic equilibrium concepts. 
Rather than defining an equilibrium concept that describes mutually dependent individual 
behavior of several players, the rational novice equilibrium defines a large population's 
average aggregate behavior that fulfills some self-consistent conditions. 
Definitions: 
a) A population of agents J 
b) A={ a 1, a 2 , ••• , aM}, the symmetric action set for the agents 
c) a_i = { apa2 , ••• , ai_., ai+~> · .. ,aJ, the action profile of the N-1 players excluding player j 
d) v! • , the payoff of player j when he is playing a. 
J" -· J 
e) v! (p) = L v! .• _, (P., · P.
2 
• ••• ·p·r-• · P.,., ·····P •• ), the average value of action a for j 
a_1eAxAx ... xA 
g) 't:9tM ~ P(9tM), the error structure 
h) u:9t ~ 9t, the utility function 
Consider the following environment. There is a population J of agents. In each 
period, each agent is matched with N-1 players to play a symmetric1 N player game. The 
random matching process is one such that the probability of playing against any group of 
1 The theory can be easily generalized to consider non-symmetric games. 
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N-1 players is the same for all agents. The draws are independent from period to period. 
Each player has the same action set A={ a 1, a 2 , ••• , aM} . The game is played forT periods. 
The value an agent receives from playing an action now depends on the actions of 
the group he matches with. Let v~r•-, be the value agent j receives when he plays a; and 
his opponents play a_i = { a~>a 2 , ••• ,ai-l' aJ+P ... ,aJ, where a 1 E A, a 2 E A ... and so on. 
Let p = {p.,, p .~, ... , p •" } be the probabilities that all the actions {a 1, a 2 , ••• , aM} are played. 
So the probability that the agent's opponents playing a_i = {al'a2 , • •• , ai-~>ai+P· · · · aJ is 
Pa · Pa ·. · · ·p. · Pa · ... ·p •. Define 
I 2 j-1 j+l n 
v! (p) = L v! .• _, (P., · P.~ ·. · · ·P.,..., · P.,., ·. · · ·p • .) · 
a_JeAxAx ... XA 
v! (p) is called the average value of action a for agent j. (This can be thought of as 
the average number of coins put in a jar by your opponents.) Since the game is symmetric 
v! (p)=v. (p) for allj . 
The agents are all assumed to be identical. The framework can be easily extend to 
heterogeneous agents by adding a type and making the error structure and the utility 
function depend on the type. 
To discuss the subjective probabilities of the average values given the best guesses, 
the priors of the average values and the process that generates the best guesses need to be 
defined. Assuming the agents have no information on the average value other than the best 
guesses, the prior distribution of the average values will be uniform in ':JiM. The process 
that generateS the beSt gueSSeS iS Called the errOr StruCtUre. Let Y( p )={ V a (p)} aeA. Define 
the error structure 't as follows: 
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The guesses defined in the last section are random variables with the property that 
g1 ={g!} has probability measure 't(v(p)) . The probability measure of the guesses g1 
aeA 
depends on the true values v(p) . 
Agent j's belief about his true values given his best guess gj is denoted by P(vjgj). 
The utility function of agent j is defined by u: 9t ~ 9t. Typically, if agent j receives value x 
from the games, his utility will be u(x) . Although the agents are all identical, they do not 
behave the same since they will have different draws of gj. 
Definition 1: 
Consider an environment (J, u(-), '!(·), P(-1·), T), qe !1M is a discrete rational 
novice equilibrium if 
Condition (A): gj has probability measure 't(v(q)) for all j. 
Condition (B): p (gj) is a selection of the solutions of the following problem for all j : 
M~ I u(Tp · v)dP(vlgj) subject to p e !1~. 
p 
Condition (C): q = I p(g)d't(v(q))(g) . 
9!M 
Definition 2: 
Consider an environment (J, u(·), '!(·), PC·I·), T), qe !1M is a continuous rational 
novice equilibrium if condition (A), (C) and the following condition hold. 
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Condition (B'): p (g l) is a selection of the solutions of the following problem for all j : 
M~ f u(Tp · v)dP(vjgJ, roJ ) subject to p e 11M . 
p 
Condition (C) states that in a rational novice equilibrium, q is the frequency of the 
actions played averaged over the random guesses and the distribution of the types. 
Condition (B) requires that each agent in the population behave according to the rational 
novice way. Condition (A) requires that the guesses that influence the behavior stated by 
condition (B) or (B') are distributed as a correct function of the equilibrium average 
frequencies q of the actions. As it has been mentioned earlier, the discrete rational novice 
equilibrium is a more faithful behavioral model since the agents can only choose their 
frequencies in multiples of Iff. However, the continuous rational novice equilibrium, as 
will be shown later, is a good approximation of the discrete one when T gets large. 
Furthermore, the continuous rational novice equilibrium is easier to work with in many 
applications. 
Although the frequencies of each agent are not probabilistic, since each agent 
draws his opponents randomly and the order of play is random for each opponent, the 
probability that an action is played in a certain period is equal to the average frequency 
that it is played. 
Each agent's strategy p(gj) is a random variable that has a probability measure 
depending on q. Hence the rational novice equilibrium q is the fixed point when 
averaging out individual strategies as functions of q. 
3.2 Theoretical Properties of the Rational Novice Equilibrium 
15 
The first two theorems establish the existence of the rational novice equilibrium. 
Theorem 1: If 
i) u(x) is concave and continuous in x, 
ii) A function f,:9tM x9tM ~9t exists such that -r(v)(B)=j8 f,(v,roi,x)dx 
for all Borel set B of 9t. (i.e. The density function of 't, f, exists.) 
f,(v ,x) is uniformly continuous in v . 
iii) P(vlgi) is weakly continuous in gi . 
then a discrete rational novice equilibrium exists. 
Proof: 
Let <p:9tM ~~ .6.~ be a correspondence defined by 
<p(g) ={p e !1~: p maximzes I u(Tp · v)dPCvlg)}. 
Let 11: !1M ~~!1M be a correspondence defined by 
I <p(g)d-r(v(q))(g) is the Gel'fand integral of the correspondence <p(g). We need to show 
9!M 
that Tl(q) has a fixed point. 
Define the set F={f::9tM ~ !1~ such that f is weakly measurable and 
"iix e 9tM, f(x) e <p(x)}. By the definition of Gel'fand integral, Tl(q) can be written as 
1]({[)={ j.f (g)d"( V({[) )(g): f e F} . 
Since u is continuous and P is weakly continuous in g, I u(Tp · v)dPCvlg) is a 
continuous function in p and g . Since .6.~ is a finite set and maximizing a continuous 
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function over a finite set always yields a solution, q>(g) ts always nonempty. This 
guarantees that ll(q) is non empty. 
Consider any f E F. Since f::~M ~ .1.~, f only has finitely many possible values. 
Let f1,f2' .. . ,fK be the possible values off. Let Bk ={xE9tMif(x)=fJ. Notice that Bk 
K 
can be the empty set for some k. I f(g)d't(v(q))(g) can be written as I, fk 't(v(q))(Bk) . 
~M k=l 
For all Bk, 't(v)(Bk)=I8 ft(v , x)dx. For any S>O, there exists a f. such that k 
I~lft(v,x)- ft(v' ,x*x<S if lv- v'l < E, since ft( v,c.oj ,x) is uniformly continuous in v. It 
implies that if lv-v'I<E, I8 Jft(v,x)-ft(v' ,x)~<S since BkE~. Hence if lv-v'I<E, 
IIsk ft(v, x)dx- Isk ft (v', x)dxl <S. Therefore, 't(v)(Bk )= Isk ft(v, x)dx is continuous in v. 
By definition (please see (e)), v(q) is linear in q. Thus 't(v(q))(Bk) is continuous 
K 
in q for all k. Therefore, I f(g)d't(v(q))(g)= I, fk 't(v(q))(Bk) is a continuous function in 
~M k~ 
q for all f E F. Define a function h: .1.M ~ .1.M such that 
h(q) = I f(g)d't(v(q))(g). 
~M 
h(q) is a selection of ll(q) by the definition of ll(q). That is, h(q) E ll(q) for all q. We 
have shown that h(q) is continuous in q. Since .1.M is convex and compact and h(q) is 
continuous in q, h(q) has a fixed point. Hence, ll(q) has a fixed point. QED 
Theorem 2: If 
i) u(x) is concave and continuous in x, 
ii) 't (v) is weakly continuous in v, 
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iii) P(vjgj) is weakly continuous in gJ. 
then a continuous rational novice equilibrium exists. 
Proof: The following lemma is needed for the proof. 
Lemma 1: Let Y be a locally convex Hausdorff space. Let X and Z be topological spaces. 
Let q>:X ~~ Y be an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with nonempty cr(Y, Y')-
compact convex values. Let P:Z ~ P(X) which maps z into probability measures of x to 
be weakly continuous. Let 11: Z ~~ Y be a correspondence defined by : 
ll(Z) = J q>(x)dP(z)(x). 
X 
Further assume (y,y') is bounded. Then ll(z) is upper hemicontinuous. Furthermore, ll(z) 
has nonempty cr(Y, Y')-compact convex values. 
Proof of lemma 1: Define the support mapping of T](z) evaluated at y' to be the real 
function ZH hTJ<z>(y'), where 
hll(Z) (y') = max { (y, y'): y E ll(Z)}. 
By the Castaing and Valadier theorem (Castaing and Valadier, "Convex Analysis and 
Measurable Multifunctions," Theorem II-20, p. 51), it is sufficient to show that ll(z) has 
nonempty cr(Y, Y') -compact convex values and zH hTJ<z> (y') is upper semicontinuous for 
each y' E Y'. 
To show that T](z) has nonempty cr(Y, Y')-compact convex values, Strassen's 
Theorem is used. Strassen's Theorem (Correspondence Form) states that if (X,I..~) is a 
probability space and if q>: X ~~ Y has nonempty, cr(Y, Y') -compact convex values and 
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Jl/h<~>< x > //dl.l.(x ) < oo, then the Gel'fand Integral of q>, J q>(x)dl.l.(X) is nonempty, cr(Y , Y' ) -
x X 
compact and convex. 
hcp<x>(y')=max{(y, y'): yEq>(x)} . Since (y, y ' ) is bounded, hcp<x>(y') is bounded 
and so llhcp<x>IJ is bounded. Therefore, Jjjhcp<x> IJdl.l.(X) < oo . Strassen's Theorem is applied 
X 
and for each z, ll(Z) = J q>(x)dP(z)(x) is nonempty, cr(Y, Y')-compact and convex. 
X 
The only thing left to show is that z~ h11<z> (y') is upper semicontinuous for each 
y' E Y' . h11<z> (y') can be written as h J <p( x)dP(z)(x) (y') . We know that : 
X 
h J ~p(x)dP<z><x> (y')= j h 111<x> (y')dP(z)( x) . 
X X 
Because q>(x) is upper hemicontinuous, hcp<x>(y') is upper semicontinuous. Therefore, 
J h111<x> (y')dP(z)(x) is also upper semicontinuous. Thus h 11<z> (y') is also upper 
X 
semicontinuous. QED. 
Once again, let q>:9tM ~~ ~M be a correspondence defined by 
q>(g)={p E ~M : p maximzes I u(Tp · vXJP(vjg,ooj)}. 
Let 11: ~M ~~ ~M be a correspondence defined by 
ll(<f)= I q>(g)d't(v(q))CiD . 
9!M 
To show that a continuous rational novice equilibrium exists, it is sufficient to show that 
ll(q) has a fixed point. Since ~M is compact and convex, according to the Kakutani Fixed 
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Point Theorem, if 11CCD is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty convex compact values, 
then T)(q) has a fixed point. 
Since u is continuous and P is weakly continuous in g, f u(Tp · v, ro )dP(v\g) is a 
continuous function in p and g. Since !:J.M is a compact and convex subset of 9tM, 
according to the Maximum Theorem, <p(g) is upper hem.icontinuous in g with compact 
values for each roe n. To show that <p(g) has convex values, consider p1 e <p(g) and 
p2 e <p(g). Since u is concave, for all A e [0, 1], 
u(T(Ap1 +(1- A)p2 ) · v) ~ Au(Tp1 • v)+(l- A)u(Tp2 · v). This implies, 
I u(T(Ap1 + (1- A)p2 ) • v)dP(vjg) ~A f u(Tp1 • v)dP(vjg) +(1- A)f u(Tp2 • v)dP(vjg) 
And since p1 and p2 maximize I u(Tp· v)dP(vjg), 
J u(T(A.p, +(1- A.)p2 ) • v )dP(vlg) ~ A.j u(ip· v)dP<vlg)+(l-A.)j u(rp · v)dP<vlg) 
for all p e !:J.M. Therefore, 
I u( T(Ap1 + (1- A)p2) · v )dP(vjg) ~ f u(Tp · v)dP(vjg) V'p e !:J.M. 
Hence Ap1 + (1- A)p2 also maximizes I u(Tp · v)dP(vjg) on !:J.M. So Ap1 + (1- A)p2 e <p(g) 
and <p(g) has convex values. 
!:J.M is locally convex. <p(g) is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty compact 
convex values. 't is weakly continuous in v and hence 't(v(q)) is weakly continuous in q 
since v(q) is continuous in q. (y, y') is bounded since y e !:J.M and y' e !:J.M. (The dual of 
!:J.M is !:J.M itself.) Applying lemma 1, T)(q) is upper hem.icontinuous with nonempty 
compact convex values for each roe n. Therefore, T)(q) has a fixed point. QED 
The next theorem establishes that the continuous rational novice equilibrium is a 
good approximation of the discrete rational novice equilibrium when T is large. 
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Theorem 3: If 
i) u(x) is concave and continuous in x, 
ii) A function f,:9tM xc:RM --7 9t exists such that 't(v)(B)= J8 f,(v,roi,x)ctx 
for all Borel set B of 9t. (i.e. The density function of 't, f, exists.) 
f,(v ,x) is unifonnJy continuous in v. 
iii) P(vlgi) is weakly continuous in gl. 
then there exist a continuous rational novice equilibrium q which is the limit of a 
subsequence of discrete rational novice equilibrium qT as T gets large. 
Proof The following lemma is needed for the proof. 
Lemma 2: Define a real continuous function f:K --7 9t and a sequence of real continuous 
functions fn: K --7 9t. Assume for each n, fn (x) = 0 has a solution X 0 • If K is compact and 
f" --7 f unifonnJy then f(x)=O has a solution when is a limit of a converging subsequence 
of {xJ. 
Proof Since K is compact, { xJ has a converging subsequence. Without loss of 
generality, it can be assumed that {xJ converges. Let x=Lim X
0
• It is sufficient to show 
n-+-
that f(x)=O. Assume otherwise. 
Assume jf(x)j > 0. Thus there exists e>O such that jf(x)j >e. Using the definition 
of X 0 , we have fn (xn) = 0 for all n. By adding and subtracting fn (x) and f(x), we have 
Therefore 
hence 
fn (xn)- fn (x) + fn (x)- f(x) + f(x) = 0 for all n. 
fn (xn)- fn (x) + fn (x)- f(x) = f(x), 
lf(x)l = lfn (xn)- fn (x) + fn (x)- f(x)l, 
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and 
Since f" (x) is continuous in x and x=Lim x", there exist some N such that if n>N 
n-.-
If" (x")- f" (x)l < e I 2. Since f" --7 f uniformly, there exist some M such that if n>M, 
If" (x)- f(x)l < e I 2. Thus jf(x)j:::; e and contradicts jf(x)j >e. QED 
By theorem l, a discrete rational novice equilibrium exists. Fu~eiJTiore, there 
exists a continuous function in qT' hT(qT)= IPT(g)d't(v(qT))(g). For all g. 
9!M 
PT (g) e <p(g)={p e !J.~: p maximzes I u(Tp · v)dP(vjg)}. 
Similarly, a continuous rational novice equilibrium exists. In addition, there exists a 
continuous function in q, h' (q) = I p(g)d't(v(q))(g). For all g , 
9!M 
p(g) e <p' (g)={p e !J.M : p maximzes I u(Tp · v)dP(v!g)}. 
A discrete rational novice equilibrium and a continuous rational novice 
equilibrium is given by qT = hT(qT) and q = h' (q) respectively. Let fT(x) = x-hT(x) and 
f(x) = x- h' (x) . Since I u(Tp · v)dP(vjg) is continuous in p, for all E > 0, there exists a T 
such that ifT>T, for all g .!PT(g)- p(g)l <E. Therefore, 
Hence IIPT(g)-p(g)ld't(v(x))(g)<E. So lhT(x)-h'(x)l<c . 
9!M 
Therefore, 
hT(x) --7 h' (x) ltniformly. Hence x- hT(x) --7 x- h' (x) uniformly. Apply lemma 2, we 
i 
have the solution of x- h(x) = 0 (which is a continuous rational novice equilibrium) is the 
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limit of x- hT(x) = 0 (which is a discrete rational novice equilibrium) as T gets large. 
QED 
The next theorem addresses the issue of the relation between the rational novice 
model and the Baysian Nash equilibrium model. Consider a symmetric N player game in 
which agent j is paid v a
1
.a_, when j is playing a i and his opponents play the joint action 
a _i = { a~>a2 , • • • ,ai-~>ai+~>· .. , aJ . Each player has M moves. The Baysian Nash equilibrium 
is the vector of mixed strategies (sp s2 , ••• , sN) where si = (s;, s~, ... , s~) is a solution to 
M L L ( a 1 a, a,.., al•J a, ) a b" t t - !::..M ax v •.•. , s ,s -, ... ,s ,s , ... ,s s su ~ec o s e . s=(s 1 .s 2 ••..• SM) 
a •-J 
Theorem 4: If 
i) the error structure 't(v) assigns probability one to v and zero to all other possible 
g E 9tM, and 
ii) P(vlgj) assigns probability one to gi (i.e., the agents believe their guesses are correct), 
then any continuous rational novice equilibrium frequency q is equal to a mixed strategy 
s of the Nash equilibrium of the single period game. Notice that the rational novice 
equilibrium q may not be unique. 
Proof Consider a rational novice equilibrium that satisfies conditions (A), (B) and (C). 
Since 't(v) assigns probability one to v , condition (A) implies gi=v(q) for all j . Since 
P(vlgj) assigns probability one to gi=v(q), condition (B) becomes for all j, p(v(q)) is the 
solution of 
M~ u(Tp · v(q)) subject to p e t::..M . 
p 
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Since u is increasing in the first argument, this is equivalent to 
Max Tp · v(q) subject to p E t::.M. 
ii 
which is equivalent to 
Max L Pa LV a.a _, CCI., . q.1 · ... ·qa,.., . qai', · .. . ·q •• ) 
P a_
1
e Ax Ax ... xA 
So condition (C) becomes 
q E p(q) 
which is equivalent to q is the solution of 
Max ""' Pa ""' v. a (q. · Cla · .•• ·q. · Cla · • • • ·q. ) p ~ ~ • -J I :! rl ;.1 n 
a a_JeAxAx ... xA 
which is the definition of a Nash behavior. QED 
Notice that even though the continuous rational novice equilibrium q is equal to 
the Baysian Nash equilibrium in the above case, it is not necessary that each agent is 
playing a Baysian Nash equilibrium. For example, consider a 2x2 game in which an agent 
chooses strategy A or B. Suppose that the Nash equilibrium is the mixed strategy playing 
A with probability 1/2 and B with probability 112. In a rational novice equilibrium of the 
same game, only the population average frequencies of A and B are 1/2. The agents are 
not required to play 1/2 A and 1/2 B. For example, a rational novice equilibrium may be 
one in which 1/2 of the agents play A all the time and 112 of the agents play Ball the time. 
The previOus example also illustrates the fundamental difference between the 
rational novice equilibrium concept and the Nash equilibrium concept. The structure of 
errors and beliefs in the rational novice model is identical to a signaling game in which 
each player receives a signal about their payoffs. Hence, each agent is faced with a 
maximization problem as if he is a Nash player in the appropriate signaling game. 
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However, in a Nash equilibrium, each player is reacting to his opponents while m a 
rational novice equilibrium, each player is reacting to a population of opponents. 
All of the above theorems assume the population is homogeneous. It is the author's 
conjecture that the same theorems hold if the population is heterogeneous. 
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Chapter 4: The Voluntary Contribution Game 
4.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a Voluntary Contribution game. 
There are two reasons why the voluntary contribution game is chosen. The first one is that 
experimental data available for analysis suggests that people are deviating from Nash 
dominant strategies. The rational novice model offers a potential explanation. The second 
reason is that in the particular voluntary contribution game that is studied in this paper, the 
rational novice behavioral model can be tested independently from the rational novice 
equilibrium concept. Recall that there are two parts to the rational novice model: the 
individual behavioral model and the rational novice equilibrium concept. In this particular 
environment, any valid rational novice individual behavioral profile is a valid rational 
novice equilibrium. Therefore, we can directly test the behavioral model without putting in 
play the aggregate principles of the rational novice equilibrium. In a later chapter, the full 
strength of the rational novice model will be tested. 
With the permission of Jeffrey Prisbrey and Thomas Palfrey1, the rational novice 
model is tested u·sing the data of their voluntary contribution game experiments. The data 
analysis consists of fitting the rational novice model to the data and making comparisons 
between the rational novice model and statistical models employed in the Prisbrey and 
Palfrey study. 
The following section will be a description of the voluntary contribution game. The 
rational novice model will be applied and a solution representing the behavioral profile will 
be solved. 
1The author would like to thank Jeffrey Prisbrey and Thomas Palfrey.here for their permission to use their 
data of voluntary contribution game experiments. 
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4.2 The Behavior Model of the Voluntary Contribution Game 
Consider a series of T voluntary contribution games. In each game, the population is 
randomly divided into groups of n. In the beginning of each game, each participant 
receives a token that is worth r dollars.2 For each agent, there are two possible actions in 
the game. The agent can choose to contribute or not to contribute his token. If he 
contributes his token, everyone in his group receives s dollars. In traditional decision 
theory, it is a dominant strategy for each participant not to contribute 'if r > s and 
contribute if r ~ s . Each game can be represented by the following payoff table: 
if k other QarticiQants contribute 
not contribute ks+r 
contribute (k + l)s 
Another variation of the game is that each agent receives N tokens, given N> I. 
The agent is allowed to contribute any number of tokens uptoN. This scenario is essential 
the same as if he plays the single token game N times under the treatment of the rational 
novice model. A more detailed discussion is provided in the next section. 
In several experimental studiesJ, subjects have been observed to contribute even 
when their dominant strategy is not to. They also do not contribute when it is a dominant 
strategy to contribute. In Palfrey and Prisbrey 1992, a series of voluntary contribution 
2In some experimental subjects receive N tokens and each can contribute none, some or all. We analyze 
that situation below. 
3 For example, see Palfrey and Prisbrey 1992, Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984, and Saijo and Yamaguchi 
1992. 
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experiments are reported. A substantial amount of contribution was observed in their 
experiments. Only 45 percent of their observations are consistent with subjects playing 
Nash strategies. But most of the players played with only a little anomalous variation in 
their choices. Furthermore, assuming each subject was employing the same cut point 
strategy, the cut point that minimizes the classification errors is very close to the one 
predicted by a Nash equilibrium. Palfrey and Prisbrey concluded the results track quite 
closely the predictions of non-cooperative theories. We want to see whether the rational 
novice model provides a better explanation for the anomalous variations. 
Each participant is assumed to have a discount factor of I. That is, the situation is 
identical to the one in which each participant is playing T voluntary contribution games 
simultaneously instead of in sequence. This assumption is reasonable when the 
experiments are carried out in a relatively short time. 
Each participant IS going to choose a frequency p of playing the option of 
keeping the token. If the game is going to be played T times, then each participant is going 
to keep the token pT times and contribute (1-p )T times. p can be different for each 
participant. Each participant is assumed to have a single period utility function equal to 
the monetary payoff. Let n denote the action of keeping the token. Let c denote the 
action of contributing. The respective single period values of the actions are given by: 
v(n) = ks+r, and 
v(c) = (k+l)s, 
where k is the expected number of contributors. The rational novice model assumes the 
agents to make errors when they evaluate their options. The internal error structure is 
assumed to be the following. Each agent makes guesses about the value of their two 
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strategies: keeping the token (denoted by n) and contributing (denoted by c). The best 
guesses can be written· as 
g(n) = ks+r+£ , 
g(c) =(k+1)s+8, 
where E and o are random variables that are independently and identically distributed. 
E(£) and E(8) are assumed to be zero. Let E(£2 ) = cr; and E(82 ) = cr~. For reasons that 
will be apparent later, £-8 is assumed to be normally distributed. E(£-8)=E(£)-E(8)=0 
and E(£-8)2=E(£2 )+E(82 )-2E(£8)=cr~ +cr~. E(£8)=0 since E and o are independent. 
Given their guesses, the agents have beliefs on the true value of their options. The value 
conditioned on their guesses are given by: 
v(njg(n)) = g(n)-£, and 
v(cjg(c)) = g(c)- 8 . 
The above belief structure assumes that every agent's belief is accurate. The value of 
playing frequency p in a single game is given by 
v(p)=p(g(n)- £) +(1- p)(g(c)- 8). 
The value of playing T games is V(p)=Tv(p). Each participant solves the following 
maximization problem: 
Max u(V(p)) subject to 0 $; p $;I . 
p 
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u() is assumed to be EV(p)-a[EV(p)~ -(EV(p))2 ]. That is, a linear combination 
of the expected value and variance of V(p). The reason to make this choice is that the 
resulting individual behavior is relatively easy to solve and similar across different games. 
If a more complex utility function, such as the Jog or the constant relative risk averse 
utility function, is used, then computation of behavior becomes intractable. 
Participants are assumed to be either risk neutral or risk averse. Therefore, they 
either dislike or do not care about variance. This assumption can be represen~ed by setting 
a ~ 0 . The expectation and the variance of the value of playing T games is 
EV(p) = T{pg(n)+(l-p)g(c)} , and 
EV(p )2 - (EV(p ))2 = T2 { cr; p 2 + cr~ (1- p )2 }. 
The participant's problem can be written as: 
Max T{pg(n)+(l-p)g(c)}-aT2 {cr;p 2 +cr~(l-p)2 } subjecttoO~p~l . 
p 
A variation of the voluntary contribution game allows the agents to receive and 
contribute more than one token. Let the number of tokens received in each game beN. In 
the situation in which agents receive a single token per period for T periods, the rational 
novice model assumes that the agents are making their T decisions simultaneously. It is 
equivalent to the situation where an agent has to decide how many tokens out of N to 
contribute. Let z be the number of tokens withheld by an agent. The expected value is 
EV(p) =zg(n)+(N-z)g(c), 
=N{( ~)g(n ) +( I-~)g(c)}. 
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This situation is equivalent to a single token voluntary contribution game in which T=N 
and p=z!N. We are not going to distinguish the difference between the single token case 
and the multiple token case in our following discussion. 
Given the maximization problem of our agents, the first-order conditions are: 
if T(g(n)- g(c))- 2aT2 {p(cr; + cr~)- crn ~ 0 then p=O 
or if T(g(n)- g(c))-2aT2 {p(cr; +cr~)-cr~} ~ 1 then p=1 
otherwise T(g(n)- g(c))- 2aT2 {p(cr; + cr~ )- crn = 0. 
The solution for p is given by: 
(*) p={2aTcr~+~(n)-g(c) if 2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; 
1 
2aTcr~+g(n)-g(c) <O 
2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; -
0 
2aTcr~+g(n)-g(c) 
1 < < . 2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; 
2aTcr~ + g(n)- g(c) 1 < ----"--::--"'----~-
- 2aTcr~ + 2aTcr~ 
The second-order condition for the non-comer solution is -2aT2 { cr; + cr~} ~ 0 which is 
satisfied automatically given our assumption that a~ 0. 
Notice that the solution now allows non-Nash behavior. Furthermore, the 
comparative statics of the solution are consistent with intuition. First, p increases as g(n)-
g( c) increases. In other words, when participants guess that the tokens have higher values 
than the public good, they are more likely to increase their frequency of keeping the token. 
~ 02 
Furthermore, p converges to 2°5 2 as a or cr~ approaches infinity. p=____::.Q_ is the 
o0+0E O~+o; 
frequency when the risk (variance of V(p)) is at a minimum. It is consistent with our 
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. k ai ) intuition that the participants will play more to minimize the ns (i.e., closer to ~ , 
Oji +O£ 
when they are making bigger errors or they care about their errors more. 
4.3 Rational Novice Equilibrium of the Voluntary Contribution Game 
Each agent can be completely characterized by o:,cr; and cr~. Hence, a type of an 
agent is a triplet ro=(o:,cr;, cr~) . The following assumptions are mad~ about the 
distribution of types : 
• o: is identical for every agent. 
• cr; and cr~ are independently and identically distributed with log normal distributions. 
The rational novice equilibrium frequency q(r-s) can be calculated by directly 
applying the definition of a rational novice equilibrium. Notice that the rational novice 
equilibrium is dependent on the environment r-s. The ability to track behavior over 
different environments enables us to estimate the model. According to condition (C), q(r-
s) can be calculated by integrating the rational novice behavior given by (*) over the 
guesses and the distribution of types. 
Notice that the rational novice behavior in the voluntary contribution game does 
not depend on q. Hence the conditions of the rational novice equilibrium are met as long 
as the agents are diversifying to hedge against their guesses. The requirement of adjusting 
to the average strategy of the population is met trivially. This special feature allows us to 
test the rational novice behavior model independent of the rational novice equilibrium 
concept. 
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q(r-s) is given by The first expectation of 
is taken over the guess g(n)- g(c). Recall 
g(n)-g(c)=r-s+E-b. Recall that £-8 is assumed to be independently and normally 
distributed. The mean of E -8 is zero and the variance of£ -8 is cr; +cr~. E (p/a.cr~,cr;) 
E-0 
can be calculated as follows . To simplify the notation, let x = 2aTcr~, y = 2aTcr~, 
~ = E- S, cr2 = cr; + cr~ and a=r-s. 
We have 
=~ <I> y-a -<I> -x-a + a e--w--e 2o· + 1-<1> y-a 0 { ( ) ( )} l h+a)2 ~~ ( ) x+y a a 0J27t(x+y) a 
Since a constant multiplied by a random variable distributed log normally is also 
distributed log normally (with a different mean), x and y are distributed log normally and 
independently with the same mean and variance. Let ii be the mean of log(x) and log(y) 
and cr2 be the variance of log(x) and log(y). The rational novice equilibrium q can be 
written as : 
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Notice that since the solution to individual behavior (equation (*)) is a non decreasing 
function of r-s, so E (pia. cri, cr~) is also a non decreasing function of r-s. Hence, q is also 
E-0 
a non decreasing function of r-s regardless of the distributions of a, cr~ and cr; . 
4.4 Data Analysis : Techniques and A Description of the Data 
The availability of the Palfrey and Prisbrey data enables me to study the application of the 
rational novice model to the voluntary contribution game empirically. The model was 
estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The pseudo R 2 is used as a benchmark of 
how well the model fits the data. The rational novice model was tested against the Nash 
equilibrium model and compared to a Probit model that is analyzed in the Palfrey and 
Prisbrey paper. 
The subjects were randomly matched into groups for the experiments. Each 
subject received 9 tokens per game4 . In each game, each subject could contribute up to 9 
tokens. Each token is worth r dollars to the owner and each token contributed is worth s 
dollars to all in the group. This game has the same rational novice structure as one in 
which each subject receives one token and plays the game for 9 times as explained in the 
last section. The experimental parameters r and s varied from period to period. 
The rational novice model is estimated as follows. For each subject and each set of 
parameters (r,s), the frequency of not contributing is calculated. A typical data point looks 
like (p,r,s) where p is the frequency of a subject withholding the tokens. A data point is 
generated from each subject in each period. Recall, the rational novice frequency is given 
by: 
4Palfrey and Jeffrey have run a number of experiments. The subjects received different number of tokens 
in different experimental sessions. In this study, only the experimental-sessions in which each subject 
received 9 tokens are analyzed. 
(*) p={2aTcr~+~(n) -g(c) if 2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; 
I 
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2aTcr~ +g(n)-g(c) <O 
2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; -
0 2aTcr~+g(n)-g(c) I < < . 2aTcr~ + 2aTcr; 
I< 2aTcr~ + g(n ) - g(c) 
- 2aTcri + 2aTcr! 
Since the distributions of g(n)-g(c), cr; and cr~ are known and a is assumed to be a 
constant, the log likelihood function of p can be calculated as follows. Letting x = 2aTcr; , 
y = 2aTcr~. ~ = E- 0, cr2 = cr; + cr~. and z=2aT. Notice that cr2 can be expressed as 
(x+y)/z. (*) becomes : 
(*) p={y+~+~ if 
y+x 
I 
y+a+~50 
y+x 
0 y+a+~ I < < . 
y+x 
I5y+a+~ 
y+x 
x and y are distributed with the same log normally density. Let the mean and variance of 
log(x) and log(y) be u and cr2 respectively. The probability of observing p=O is 
prob( ~ 5 -y- a)= r fo- <1>( -:-• ~<I>( log<~H )d<t>( log<r >-u) . The probability of observing p= I is 
prob(~ 5 x- a)= J: fo- <1>( •:• ~<1>( log<~>-ii )d<t>( log<~>-ii). The density of p for O<p<I 
(
y(p-l)+xp-a)2 
iS r- r- I e - cr d<l>( log(~ )-u)d<t>(log(~)-u). Jo Jo 7fT[ cr cr 
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Each data point represents the decision a subject made in one period. In each 
period, each subject received 9 tokens and he could choose to contribute any number of 
them. Let P; be the fraction of tokens a subject keeps for himself. Let r; and s; be the 
relevant private good value and public good value respectively. Since the number of 
tokens received is 9, P; is only feasible when it is in increments of 1/9. However, the 
continuous model is used as an approximation when the likelihood function is calculated. 
The Jog likelihood function L; of the data point (P;, a, = r;- s;) with parameter set 
(u, cr2 ,z) can be written as: 
P; =0 
if 0 < P; < 1. 
P; = 1 
The total log likelihood of a data set is L(u,cr2 ,z)= L,.L;. The estimates and maximum log 
i 
likelihoods are listed in Table 1. 
The maximum likelihood technique requires the data to be distributed 
independently. The rational novice model cannot guarantee independence when a subject 
has to face the same private good value and public good value pair more than once. 
Therefore, if the same subject received the same private good value and public good value 
in two different periods, the data from both periods would be discarded. 
With the estimated (u ,cr2 ,z), the rational novice equilibrium frequency q(a) can be 
calculated. Although q(a) itself has no statistical significance, it is a useful aid to give a 
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sense of how accurate the rational novice model is on average. To give a sense of how 
close q(a) and the actually average frequency is, the pseudo R 2 is calculated. The pseudo 
ssr 
R 2 is defined as pseudo R 2=1-=, 
ssr 
where 
If the model explains the data set perfectly, the sum of residuals ssr will be zero and the 
pseudo R 2 will be one. The closer to one the pseudo R 2 is, the better explanatory power 
the model has. The pseudo R 2 is listed in Table 3. To convey graphically how well the 
model is fitting, the average frequency of the subjects playing not contributing is 
calculated for each a=r-s. This is compared to the estimated average frequency q(a) in 
Figure 1. 
The Nash equilibrium is a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. The Nash 
equilibrium corresponds to the special case when (u = -oo, cr2 = 0 ). (All the agents are 
making no mistakes when cr~ =a;= 0.) The likelihood for (u = -oo,cr2 = 0) is zero if the 
data deviates from the Nash equilibrium theory in any amount. Instead of testing 
(u =-co, cr2 = 0) which will result in automatic rejection of the Nash theory, the 
hypothesis (u = -c, cr2 = 0) is tested. Some latitude is given to the Nash equilibrium. I call 
the hypothesis (u = -c, cr2 = 0 ) the relaxed Nash model. c is chosen such that -c is a lot 
smaller than the maximum likelihood estimate of u. c=25 is used. For larger values of c , 
the likelihood of the relaxed Nash model becomes very small. The hypothesis 
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(u = -c, cr" = 0 ) is tested using the likelihood ratio test. The appropriate restrictions and 
statistics are listed in Table 2. 
In the Palfrey and Prisbrey paper, a Probit analysis was performed to estimate the 
agents' responses. In this paper, a similar Probit analysis is carried out and compared to 
the rational novice model. Only the simplest Probit model in the Palfrey and Prisbrey paper 
is analyzed in this paper. The dependent variable is the investment decision. The 
independent variables are the constant and the marginal rate of substitution between the 
private and the public good. The Palfrey and Prisbrey study uses the marginal rate of 
substitution between the public good and the private good, the inverse of the variable used 
here. The estimates and the maximum log likelihood are listed in Table 1. Two methods 
are used to compare the rational novice model to the Probit model. The pseudo R 2of the 
Probit model, which is used as a benchmark for the explanatory power of the model, is 
calculated and is listed in Table 3. The pseudo R2 is an adequate benchmark for the 
performance of a model but it does not enable an investigator to reject one model 
statistically in favor of another. 
It would ·be useful if one model were nested in the other but unfortunately that is 
not true here. Recall that r=the private good value and s=the public good value. The 
probit model can be written in the following way. A subject does not contribute if 
a+ b( ~) + E >0 where a,b are parameters of the model and E a normally distributed 
random variable with mean zero. The condition can be rewritten as ar+bs+rE >0. The 
rational novice model is given by(*) . If a.>O then these are clearly non nested models. In 
the special case that a.=O, a subject does not contribute if r-s+l; >0. This is only equivalent 
to the probit model if a=-b and the distribution of l; depends on s. So although a special 
case of the rational novice model is equivalent to a special. case of the probit model, the 
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two models are non nested. The above arguments apply to the case in which each subject 
is given one token. Since both the rational novice model and the Probit model treat all the 
decisions on the 9 tokens to be simultaneous, the above arguments should extend to the 
multiple token case. In our analysis, each subject receives 9 tokens in each period. 
Therefore, for each data point, the likelihood function of the Probit model can be written 
as: 
Li = (~)Prob(a+b(~)+E>O)z' Prob(a+b(~)+£:50)9-z•, 
where zi is the number of tokens the subject does not contribute. This likelihood function 
is not nested into the one of the rational novice model stated earlier. 
4.5 Data Analysis : Results 
The rational novice model is estimated using the Palfrey and Prisbrey data sets5. The 
techniques of the estimation and the log likelihood function are discussed in the last 
section. The estimates and log likelihood statistics are listed in Table 1. Figure 1 and 2 
display graphical representations of the estimation of the rational novice model with the 
whole data set and with the first five periods discarded. In the figures, the rational novice 
equilibrium frequencies are calculated using the maximum likelihood estimates and are 
compared to the data. The estimates (u,cr2 ,z) represent the distribution of the errors cr~ 
and cr; in the population. (Recall cr~ and cr; have the same distribution.) The distribution 
of cr 5 and cr E is plotted in figure 3 for the whole data set and in figure 4 when the first 5 
periods are discarded. The errors cr5 and crE are plotted in the unit of the U.S. dollar. cr5 
or cr E is smaller than 0.61 dollars 80 percent of the time and less than 1.26 dollars 90 
percent of the time when the whole data set is used for estimation. If the first 5 periods are 
51 thank Thomas R.Palfrey and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey for letting me use their data. 
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discarded, then a 5 or a r is smaller than 2.3 dollars 80 percent of the time and smaller than 
5 dollars 90 percent of the time. As it can be seen, with typical public good values from 3 
to 15 dollars and private good values ranging from I to 20 dollars, most of the time the 
subjects were making small errors (in relation to their public or private good values). 
The following are the major results. The first result deals with the statistical 
accuracy of the rational novice model. There is no absolute measure of how accurate a 
model is. However, the pseudo R 2 defined in the previous section is a benchmark of 
explanatory power that a model has. The interpretation of the actual numbers is left to the 
reader. 
Result 1 : The rational novice model is a fairly accurate statistical model. 
Support : The pseudo R 2 of the rational novice model is 0.67 when all the data is used 
and 0.75 when the first 5 periods are discarded from all the experiments. 
It is also interesting to see that the explanatory power of the rational novice model 
increases when the data from the first 5 periods of the experiments are discarded. It looks 
as if the subjects were "learning" to play the rational novice equilibrium. 
Since the Nash model is a special case of the rational novice model, the rational 
novice model will always have better statistical accuracy. The important question is 
whether the rational novice model is a significant improvement over the Nash model. The 
answer to this question according to result 2 is yes. The Nash model can be rejected in 
favor of the rational novice model that were estimated. 
40 
Result 2 : The relaxed Nash model can be rejected as a special case of the rational novice 
model. 
Support : Using the likelihood ratio test, the relaxed Nash models (c=25) can be rejected 
at 5 percent significance. The test statistics are listed in Table 2. 
Rejecting the Nash model should come as no surprise. It is more interesting to see 
if the rational novice model can do better than the Probit model. Although we did not 
conduct any statistical tests, it is our conjecture that the rational novice model performs 
better than the Probit model. 
Conjecture : The rational novice model is better than the Probit model. 
Support : The pseudo R 2 s of the rational novice model are higher both when all the data 
are used and when the first 5 periods are discarded. 
4.6 Comments and Discussions 
This research introduces a new approach to game theory modeling. This new approach is 
aimed at explaining deviations from traditional game theory predictions. Some theorists 
attribute deviations from game theory to errors people make. Both the Harsanyi model 
and the McKelvey and Palfrey quanta! response model assume subjects observe erroneous 
payoffs. The rational novice model takes one step further by adding a principle of optimal 
response to the risks associating with erroneous payoffs. The rational novice model is able 
to explain human errors as a function of the economic environment. A combination of 
bounded rationality and risk diversification is utilized to develop the rational novice 
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equilibrium model. The general framework of this new model is discussed and the 
equilibrium for the voluntary contribution game is solved in this framework. 
The voluntary contribution game represents a paradox in game theory modeling. 
On one hand, in traditional game theory, people are predicted not to contribute when their 
marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good is greater than I . On 
the other hand, experimental investigations have shown that people indeed do contribute 
when the traditional game theory predicts otherwise. In a series of experiments reported in 
Palfrey and Prisbrey 1992, substantial contributions are observed to be at odds with the 
traditional game theory. Palfrey and Prisbrey's analysis show that the observations are 
mostly consistent with non-cooperative theories but there are still deviations that cannot 
be explained. Some subjects even deviated from the Nash strategy when their marginal 
rate of substitution between the private and the public good was less than one. Palfrey and 
Prisbrey employ a Probit analysis which explains the data fairly well. 
The rational novice model is proposed as an alternative model to explain non-Nash 
behavior in voluntary contribution games. Instead of assuming each agent has an 
additional incentive to deviate from the Nash strategy, deviations come naturally when the 
agents diversify against the risk of miscalculating the values of their options. 
Result 1 suggests that the rational novice model is a fairly accurate model in 
explaining the data. The estimates show that assuming that agents were making small 
errors is enough to explain the variation in the data. Result 2 indicates that the rational 
novice model is not only a more accurate model than the Nash model, the improvement 
over the Nash model is significant according to the likelihood ratio tests. This should not 
come as a surprise since we know that Nash models fail to explain why people deviate 
from dominant strategies while the rational novice model offers an explanation. It is also 
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my conjecture that the rational novice model performs better than the Palfrey and Prisbrey 
Probit model. 
In summary, the rational novice model is a reasonably accurate model of agents' 
behavior in voluntary contribution games. Additional data analysis is underway to provide 
a statistical test to distinguish between the Probit model and the rational novice model. 
The power of this new approach is that the general framework of the rational novice 
behavioral model is applicable to any finite game. 
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Chapter 5: First Price Sealed Bid Private Value Auctions 
5.1 Overview 
The first price sealed bid auction has been studied. In "Theory and Individual 
Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Cox, Smith and Walker 1988 (CSW) concluded that 
game theory could adequately explain auctions generated under laboratory conditions. 
Kagel, Harstad and Levin (KHL) in a 1987 study concluded that one Nash model, namely 
the Risk A verse Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (RASNE), was the best model amongst the 
ones they investigated although when applied to individual bids, sophisticated discounting 
models could not be statistically ruled out. Most of the previous studies were under a 
linear environment. Chen and Plott conducted a series of experiments under nonlinear 
conditions and found that the Constant Relative Risk Averse Model (CRRAM), another 
Nash model, offers a good explanation of individual behavior. However, it failed to 
outperform a sophisticated piece wise linear rule-of-thumb. 
In the Chen and Plott study, the solution of the CRRAM is defined by a differential 
equation that does not have a closed form solution. The authors had to employ 
complicated computer techniques to calculate a numerical solution. It is unlikely that all 
the subjects were able to arrive at the same solution simultaneously. The fact that the 
CRRAM can explain the data reasonably well but not perfectly indicates that the subjects 
may be trying to behave rationally without complete success. 
The rational novice model was developed as an attempt to provide a better 
theoretical model. Agents are no longer modeled as perfect rational decision makers. 
Instead, random noise is introduced into agent's decision making process. The size of the 
noise defines the amount of rationality an agent has. A small amount of noise results in 
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strategy profiles close to that of Nash models while a large amount of noise leads to Jess 
"perfect" behavior. One natural consequence of this approach is that statistical variations 
are no longer a random unexplainable phenomenon. Given a structural framework of this 
noise, the fluctuations in behavior can be predicted. 
The objective here is to solve the first price auction under the rational novtce 
model and compare that solution to the solutions of other Nash models. The specific Nash 
model focused here is the CRRAM. The CRRAM is a very extensively studied model (see 
Chen and Plott). It explains the data reasonably well. In the Chen and Plott study, the 
CRRAM tracks the observed nonlinear behavior with success. It was also found that the 
CRRAM is the best amongst a number of other Nash models (mostly ones that assume 
homogeneous agents). 
No closed form solution was found for the rational novice model. Numerical 
solutions were found using computational techniques. The specific rational novice model 
developed here is a one parameter model. The model depends on a single parameter that 
describes the average of the risk attitude in the population. This parameter is estimated 
from the data obtained from the Chen and Plott experiments. Notice that the rational 
novice model is a one parameter model while the CRRAM has as many parameters as the 
number of agents. In the Chen and Plott study, there were twelve subjects in each 
experimental session. Thus, the CRRAM has twelve parameters. Just in a pure data 
analysis point of view, it is more likely that the CRRAM will perform better than the 
rational novice model. If it turns out that the rational novice model can explain the model 
better, it will be strong evidence that the rational novice model has captured certain 
aspects of behavior that elude the Nash models. 
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5.2 First Price Sealed Bid Auction 
Consider an N-person first price sealed bid auction. Let j= { 1 , ... ,N} index agents. 
The value of the unit being auctioned to the jth agent is a random variable vi . v J has the 
distribution H(x) and it is independent across j and time. vJ is realized in the beginning of 
each auction and is the jth agent's private information. Each agent then submits a bid and 
the highest bidder buys the unit at the price of his bid. Let bi be the bid of the jth agent. If 
the jth agent is the highest bidder, then his profit from this auction will be vi- b i. All the 
other agents receive no profit. 
The N-person first price auction is well studied. Cox, Smith and Walker 
developed the Constant Relative Risk A verse Model (CRRAM) to explain a series of first 
price auction experiments they have conducted. In "Nonlinear Behavior In Sealed Bid 
First Price Auctions," Chen and Plott make comparisons between three Nash models 
under conditions different from the CSW study .1 The three Nash models are the Risk 
Neutral Nash Equilibrium Model (RNNE), the Risk Averse Symmetric Nash Equilibrium 
Model (RASNE) and CRRAM. Under RNNE, all agents are identical and risk neutral. 
Under RASNE, agents are identical but risk averse. Under CRRAM, agents are 
heterogeneous and risk averse. Risk aversion is characterized by a one parameter utility 
function. It is assumed that the distribution of risk aversion is common knowledge. In both 
the CSW study and Chen and Plott study, the CRRAM was found to be the best model. 
The next section provides a brief overview of the three variations of the Nash 
model studied in the Chen and Plott paper. The only differences among these three 
variations are the assumptions made on the risk attitudes of the subjects. 
1The Chen and Plott study was made with nonuniform distributed private values while the CSW study 
used uniform distributions. The nonlinearity in the Chen and Plott study enables the researchers to 
separate the models with relative ease. 
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5.2.1 Nash Equilibria 
In the Chen and Plott paper, three Nash equilibrium models are studied. Although 
only one of the three models will be compared to the rational novice model in the data 
analysis section, all three are listed here for completeness. 
1) The Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium Model 
Agents are assumed to be identical and risk neutral. They are expected utility 
maximizers with the utility function u(x)=x. With uniform distributed private values, the 
equilibrium bidding function is ~ v where n=number of bidders in the auction and 
n 
v=private value. 
2) The Risk A verse Symmetric Nash Equilibrium Model 
Agents are assumed to be identical and risk averse. They are expected utility 
maximizers with the utility function u(x)=x r. r is called the risk aversion parameter. Since 
all the agents are assumed to be identical, r is the same for every agent. With uniform 
distributed private values, the equilibrium bidding function is "~;~r v. When the agents are 
more risk averse (r decreases), bids increase. 
3) The Constant Relative Risk Averse Model 
Agents are assumed to be risk averse and have utility function u(x)=x r. The risk 
parameter r is assumed to distribute according to some publicly known distribution G(r). 
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All three Nash models are deterministic and do not allow for fluctuations in 
behavior. For example, the RNNE predicts a perfect linear relationship between the bids 
and the private values. However, in previous empirical studies, investigators found that the 
bids and private values did not correlate perfectly. Ad hoc random variables are usually 
added to the equilibrium bidding functions to "accommodate" observed fluctuations in 
previous analyses. 
5.3 The Rational Novice Equilibrium 
In this section, a rational novice equilibrium will be solved for the first price sealed 
bid auction. The central principle of the rational novice model is that each agent evaluates 
their strategic situation imperfectly and responds to the imperfection in a risk averse (or 
risk loving) manner. In the first price sealed bid auction, a lower bid increases the profit 
and decreases the probability of winning the auction. Each agent must find an optimal 
balance between possible profit and the chance of winning. In the rational novice model, 
each agent is incapable of evaluating the probability of winning correctly. Each of them 
only receives a noisy signal of what that probability is. 
This model predicts that if the auctions are played repeatedly with different 
opponents, each agent will diversify his actions and employ a spread of bids instead of just 
a single optimal one. 
The formal theory is as follows. 
5.3.1 The Rational Novice Model 
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Consider a symmetric game in which each agent has K actions to choose from. 
Agents are chosen from a large population to play the game. Agents are assumed to be 
imperfect. Imperfection is defined by a sequence of random variable {Ek: k = 1... K} . When 
each agent tries to evaluate the value of his k th choice, he received a noisy signal. Let xk 
be the true value of the k th action and gk be the signal the agent received. It is assumed : 
We assume that Ek has zero mean and is distributed independently across k. Ek is also 
assumed to have a normal distribution. Let cr; be the variance of Ek . Each agent bases his 
decision on his signals { gk : k = I ... K} . Having only observed his noisy signals, the true value 
of the k th action is a random variable given by : 
where Sk is also independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance cr~. The 
game is repeated T times. Each agent chooses what his actions will be in the T games. The 
agent is assumed not to discount. Therefore, the order of play is not important. The agent 
only cares about how many times each action is played. Let pk be the fraction of times that 
the agent is playing action k. In T games, the total number of times the k th action played is 
K 
pk T. The total value of the T games to the agent is TI,pk (xk lgk ). Notice that pk is not a 
k~l 
probability and not a mixed strategy. p~ is the exact fraction of the times an action is 
played in T games. 
Assuming the agent maximizes a weighted sum of the expected value and the variance, 
the maximization problem is : 
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K 
subject to L Pk = J2, 
k=l 
where E(.) denotes taking expectation over the random variable xklgk. Var(.) is the 
variance operator. Substituting (3.1) into (3.2), we have 
K 
(5.3) subject to I,. pk = 1 and Pt 2: o for all k. 
k=l 
Let A. be the Lagragian multiplier. The first order condition of (3.3) is given by : 
Notice that for a risk averse agent, a > 0 . Thus the second order condition is always 
satisfied. Solving (5.4), we have 
if 
The summation is taken over k's where Pt >0. 
Pt is called the optimal behavioral strategy of the agent. The optimal behavioral 
strategy Pt of each agent depends on his signal which is random. Thus, Pt is also random 
in nature. Therefore, it is more interesting to look at the population-average of the optimal 
behavioral strategy. a and cr~ are assumed to be identical across agents. To simplify the 
2 pk is also constrained to be non-negative. In the following discussion, we assume that this constraint is 
not binding. 
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problem, an approximation was made. For any continuous function f(x), the Taylor 
expansion implies Ef(x)=E(f(Ex)+f(Ex)(Ex-x)+ ... ). When the central higher moments of x 
is small, Ef(x) can be approximated by f(Ex). The population-average rational novice 
strategy pk is obtained by taken the expectation of pk with respect to gk. When the errors 
are small, the population-average of the optimal behavioral strategy, pk, is approximated 
by 
(5.5) if 
Each individual optimal behavior is not a mixed strategy, and thus does not 
describe a random distribution of actions. However, since the signals are random, the 
population-average of the optimal behavioral strategy pk describes the distribution of 
actions. Hence, when a large group of agents is brought in and made to play the game, the 
observed probability of the k'h action being chosen should be pk . 
5.3.2 Rational novice Behavior in First Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
Consider a population of identical agents. Let us assume that each agent's private 
value is restricted to integers from 0 to v. Also assume that the bids are also restricted to 
integers. Each agent is going to adopt a different bidding profile for each private value v. 
Assume that the agents only care about their expected profit in the first price sealed bid 
auctions. When the private value is v, the bid b is worth x; = (v- b)G(b) to the agent. G(b) 
is the probability of winning when bid b is submitted. 
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The choice of a~ is less obvious. The choice of a constant a~ would make the 
problem technically easier to solve but represent a less "realistic" scenario. My guideline to 
pick a~ is that a~ should be roughly increasing with the true value x ~. The choice of a~ is : 
a~ =a 2 (v-b)2 G(b) . 
where a 2 is a convenient scaling factor. The choice of a~ is made based on two reasons. 
The first is an intuitive one. One would expect the size of the error to be dependent of the 
potential value. Consider the extreme case where the bid is close to the private value. 
Since the potential profit is the difference between the two, when the bid is close to the 
private value, one would expect the agent to consider this an unworthy bid no matter how 
he evaluates G(b). On the other hand, when the potential profit is larger, there is more 
room for the agent to make errors. The second reason is a practical one. A few other 
choices of a~ were used as trials and they do not provide reasonable results. For example, 
if a~ is constant (i.e., a~ does not depend on the private value and the bid), the model 
predicts underbidding when agents are risk averse. This is consistent with neither other 
models nor experimental observations. 
For each value v, the bid is restricted to a value from 0 to v-1. This restriction is 
made solely because of this particular choice of a~ =a2 (v -b)2 G(b) . The reason is that at 
the point b=v, a; is zero. Consequently, an interior solution does not exist. Therefore, this 
restriction is put in place mainly to facilitate the derivation of a solution. 
Substituting x~ = (v- b)G(b) and a; =a 2 (v-b) 2 G(b) into equation (5.5), the 
population-average rational novice behavior is given by : 
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(5.6) 
{ 
0 
r-' -r p ' = I I I k v-k 
• Y[ v-b- (v-b)'G(b) ;,._.,,0 ,.,] if 
I [ I 
y v-b 
I [ I 
y v-b 
where y = 2acr2T. The summation over k is taken over k's where 'P: >0. 
The rational novice equilibrium of the first price auction is a collection of bids' 
distribution, one for each possible private value. Equation (5.6) characterizes this 
distribution. This is called the rational novice distribution of bids. 
The probability of winning G(b) is a function of the rational novice distribution of 
bids. Therefore, if we want to fully characterize the rational novice equilibrium, we have 
to solve for the G(b) for each possible b. Let qv be the probability that v is drawn as the 
private value. If we draw an agent randomly from the population, let pb be the probability 
that he will submit the bid b. pb is given by : 
Let pb<B be the probability that in the population, a bid will be less than B. Pb<B is given 
by: 
In anN-person auction, G(B) is given by : 
(5.7) G(B) =(pb<Bt- 1 + m~2 (:~1J(PBr-1 (pb<Bt-m ~ for B=O to v-1. 
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The first tenn is the probability that every other bidder submits a lower bid. The second 
tenn is the probability that the agent wins the auction if he ties with m-1 other agents. 
When there is a tie, the unit is randomly assigned to one of the agents. 
Equation (5.6) and (5 .7) fully characterize the rational novice equilibrium of the 
private value first price auction. 
5.3.3 Comparative Statics 
In this section, I would like to examine the effects of risk aversion on the rational 
novice equilibrium. In past studies, it was shown that risk aversion generally will cause the 
agents to bid more in the first price auction. Since in the rational novice equilibrium it is no 
longer true that agents follow a single-value bidding function, the corresponding behavior 
is a little more complicated to describe. 
Essentially, there are three aspects of the effects of risk aversion I would like to 
study. The first one is the spread of the bids. Intuitively, a more risk averse population will 
spread the bids in over wider range. This concept is difficult to quantify. The measure I 
use in this paper is the number of bids with a positive probability of being played. 
The second aspect is that when risk aversion goes to zero, we expect to see the 
risk neutral Nash equilibrium. The third aspect is that of the sizes of the bids. In a Nash 
model, agents bid more when risk aversion is present. Does the same still hold in the 
rational novice model? Since the agents in the population are now bidding according to a 
distribution, it is a little more complicated to determine whether the agents are bidding 
more or less. One method is to look at how the expected bid changes when risk aversion 
changes. Unfortunately, the analysis of the expected bid is ·inconclusive. The expected bid 
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can go either way when risk aversion changes. Another way is to look at the bid at which 
p~ is at a maximum. 
The following subsections describe the effects of risk aversion on the bid spread 
and the bid submitted with maximum probability. 
5.3.3.1 Bid Spread 
The rational novice equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of bids given by 
equation (5 .6). The model only has one parameter y which describes the characteristics of 
the population. Recall y = 2acr2T. Thus, the effects of risk aversion (a), relative size of 
the errors ( cr2 ) and the number of auctions carried out (T) are inseparable in the model. 
Recall the rational novice distribution of bids is given by : 
(5.6) p~=j..!_ [_l 
y v-b 
0 
I r_!_-y l k v-k if [ I l 1 I 1 r - -1 - --- k v-k <0 '( v-b (v-b)2 G(b) ~ ( v-k )' G<k> -
[ 
I l I I I ~ v-h-7 ---- >0 
'( v-b ( v-b)2 G(b) ~ < v- k ),G( k) 
while the summation with index k is over the bids with positive probability. 
Claim 1: For a fixed v, the number of bids with positive probability (i.e., p~>O) is non 
decreasing in y . 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that when y increases, all the bids with positive probability 
remains so. Let B be the set of bids with positive probability given v. So, for all be B, 
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(5 .8) - -- 2 keB v-k >0. 1 [ 
1 1 I - '- y l 
y v-b (v-b) G(b) k;B (v-k )2 G(k ) 
Let y+>y. Assume when y increases toy+, some bid b has probability 0 . Let B-=B-{b} . 
If bid b has probability 0, the follow must be satisfied. 
(5.9) _1_[_1_- 1 kJs-~-y+ l < 0 
y+ V- b ( V- b ) 2 G(b) ke~- ( v-k)2 G{k ) - • 
Since y and y+ are positive, (3.8) and (3.9) implies 
which implies 
I - 1 -y+ I - 1- - y 
k eB- v-k > ___::kc::.EB:::..._v-_,.k __ 
I 2 I 2 keB- (v-k) G{k) keB {v-k) G{k ) 
Since B-=B-{b}, I _ I_= I _1 ___ 1_ 
kEB- V-k k EB V-k V-b 
and 
Therefore, 
After some algebra, one arrives at: 
(5.10) (y•-y) I ~ +-1- I ~ - 1 I - 1- + y <0 
keB (v-k)2 G(k) v-b keB (v-k)2G(k) (v-b)2 G(b) keB v-k (v- b)2 G{b) · 
However, (5.8) alone implies 
-
1
- I I - I I - 1-+ y >0 
v- b keB (v-k )2G(k ) (v-b)2G(b) keB v-k (v-b)2 G(b) · 
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Since (y• - y ) I ., >0, we arr1ve at a contradiction. Therefore all the bids with 
lce B ( v-lc )-G( Ic ) 
positive probability will remain so if y increases. QED. 
The bids spread out more when y increases. Recall that "( = 2acr2T . y increases with both 
risk aversion (a) and the potential size of errors ( cr2 ). Claim 1 is consistent with our 
intuition. When people become more risk averse, they will spread their bids out more to 
hedge against their potential errors. The same thing will happen if their risk attitude 
remains constant while the sizes of their potential errors increase. 
5.3.3.2 Bids Submitted with Maximum Probability 
Let us first examine the case where y is very small. It is expected that the rational 
novice equilibrium will resemble the risk neutral Nash equilibrium when y goes to zero. 
Claim 2: When y approaches zero and when there is only one bid with positive 
probability, that bid is the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. 
I I I r--r 
proof Consider a continuous function defined by f(b, y)=---
2 
k v- k 
v-b (v-b) G(b) ;(v-k >'G<kl 
When f(b,y) is greater than zero, f(b,y) gives the values of p~. Let f(b.,y) be the 
maximum of f(b, y). b · is obtained by differentiating f with respect to b and setting it equal 
to zero. It yields the following : 
r....!......-r (v-b.)G(b. )2 =(2G(b. )- (v-b)G'(b. )) kv-k 
; (v-k )2 G(k ) 
Since only bid b has positive probability, I - 1- =- 1- and I 1 
1c v-k v- b 1c ( v-k )2 G(k) 
go to zero, we have 
I L . 
( v-b)2G(b) . ettmg y 
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I 
(v- b • )G(b • )2 = (2G(b* ) - (v- b)G' (b• )) v-b· 
which implies 
G(b *) = (2G(b* ) -(v- b)G' (b *)) 
Simplifying the above, we have: 
(5 .11 ) (v-b)G'(b* ) =G(b*). 
(v-b' )2 G(b' ) 
The risk neutral Nash equilibrium is given by maximizing (v-b)G(b). Differentiating with 
respect to b, we have 
(v-b)G'(b)=G(b) 
which is exactly (3.11 ). QED 
In claim 2, we have established that in the limit where everyone is risk neutral, the rational 
novice equilibrium becomes the Nash equilibrium. The following claim examines the 
effects of risk aversion in the neighborhood of the risk neutral case. 
Claim 3: The bid with maximum probability is increasing in y . 
Proof : Recall in the proof of claim 2, it is shown that the bid with the maximum 
probability is given by 
r_!_-r 
(v- b')G( b' )2 =(2G(b' )-(v - b)G' (b' )) kv-k • 
f (v- k ) 2G( k ) 
Rearranging terms, we have : 
I ( v-b')G(b' ) 2 _ f~-r 
(2G(b' )-(v-b)G'(b' )) - f <v- k ),G( k ). 
Taking derivatives with respect to y on both sides, we have : 
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[ 2(v- b. )0 (b' )0' (b' ) -O(b' )~ ][ 20 (b. )-( v - b. )0' (b. >]-[ (Y - b • )0 (b' )2 ] [ 30 ' (b' ) - (v-b. )0" (b" >] db' _1 
(20 (b' ) - (v-b)O' (b" ))' dy - fc·-••'Glkl 
In the neighborhood of risk neutrality, (v- b)G' (b • ) = G(b • ). Substituting into the above, 
we have 
( 2G(b' )2 -G(b' )2 ]( 2G(b. ) - G(b ' )]-( G(b.)3 I G' (b *)]( 3G' (b' ) - (v- b' )G'' (b' )] db' = - ---.1-
(G(b' )) 2 dy f <v-ldG<k> 
Simplifying the above, we have 
( G(b • )- [ G(b •) I G' (b •) ][ 3G' (b •) - ( v- b • )G" (b •) J) ~ • = - t 
"( ~ ( v-k)2G(k} 
The above implies 
The Nash equilibrium is obtained by maximizing (v-b)G(b). Therefore, the 2nd derivative 
of (v-b)G(b) should be negative. Thus, (v-b)G"(b)-2G'(b)<0. Hence 2G'(b)-(v-b)G"(b)>O. 
So (5.12) implies db • >0. QED. 
dy 
In a way, the above result shows that risk aversion leads to overbidding. This is 
consistent with both the traditional Nash models and the observed behavior in 
experiments. 
5.4 Numerical Analysis 
Equation (5.6) and (5.7) characterize the rational novice equilibrium of the private 
value first price auction. No closed form solution is found for the rational novice bid 
distribution. However, numerical methods are developed· to calculate this distribution 
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under the experimental conditions that we are about to analyze. The only relevant 
experimental condition that affects the rational novice equilibrium is the distribution of the 
private value q • . 
The numerical method is an iterative procedure that will provide the solution for 
{G(B):B = o ... v -1}. The procedure starts with a guess of the function {G(B):B = o ... v -1} . In 
this study the starting guess is of the form : 
l ax G (x) = b ,..... a+(l-a)(~) 1000-b if x<b b s; x"'" 
Then, the following steps are carried out. 
Step 1 :Set G 1(b)=G,uc_.. (b) for b=O,l, ... ,v-1. 
Step 2: Calculate p~ as a function of {G,(b):b=O ... v-1} using the following: 
p~={_!_ [_1 
y v-b 
0 
I r _:_-y l 1c. v - k if [ r-' -y l _!_ _1__ 1 k v-k s;o y v-b (v b)2 G 1 (b) ~ (v-k)' G,(k ) 
[ 
I l I I I ~ v-h -y ---- >0 
y v-b (v-b)2 G 1(b) ~<•-k >' G,(kl 
Step 3: Calculate G2 (b) by using the following equations: 
8-1 
= I: pb b=O 
60 
~- 1 ~ 
Step 4 : Calculate 6.= I,(G 1(b)- G2 (b))-. When 6. is smaller than a certain threshold value, 
h =O 
stop. Otherwise, set G1(b)=G 2 (b) for b=O,I , ... ;v-1 and go back to step 2. 
When 6. =0, the above procedures will ensure that G 1 (b) (and G 2 (b)) is a solution 
to equation (5.6) and (5.7). Analysis revealed that this process converges quite fast. Under 
our experimental parameters the process usually converges in fewer than 10 iterations with 
a threshold of 0 .1. 
5.5 Data Analysis: Techniques and A Description of the Data 
In the Chen and Plott study, several experiments were conducted in which non-
uniform distributed private values were assigned to the subjects. Six experiments were 
conducted in the Chen and Plott study. There were twelve subjects in each experiment. 
Some subjects participated in more than one experiment. The experiments were conducted 
in periods. In each period, the subjects were randomly divided into groups of three who 
would bid against each other in a sealed bid auction. After the subjects were randomly 
assigned, the private value would be revealed to the appropriate subject via a computer 
link. The subject then entered a bid into the computer. 
Although the private values were known only to the appropriate subject, the 
distribution of the values was common knowledge. The private values were drawn from 
distribution of the following form. In three of the six experiments, the values are drawn 
from either a range from 0 to 999. Let q v be the probability of v being drawn. The 
probability of drawing the private value vis given by: 
{ 
a I 500 
q' = (1- a) I 500 if 
v <500 
500< v 
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In the other three of the six experimental sessions, an offset of 500 was added to 
all the private values. That is, the values are drawn from a range from 500 to 1499. And 
the corresponding probabilities are : 
{ 
a/ 500 
q , = (1-a)/ 500 if 
v < 1000 
1000< v 
There were two values of a being used in the experiments. In four of the six experiments, 
a=0.8. In the other two, a=0.2. In table 4, a summary of the different parameters of the 
experiments is reported. 
Since the rational novice model depends only on (v-b), a linear transformation is 
performed on the data to bring the range of the values and the bids down to [0,999]. Then 
the same estimation procedure is carried out. 
In the Chen and Plott investigation, the Nash equilibrium is studied. The Nash 
equilibrium under this experimental environment exhibits nonlinear bidding functions. 
Subjects were observed to have employed nonlinear strategies. One Nash model, the 
Constant Relative Risk Averse Model (CRRAM) offers a good explanation. The CRRAM 
manages to outperform nearly all other models except one, the Sophisticated Ad Hoc 
Mode (SOP AM) which basically is a piece-wise linear model. 
All the models studied in the Chen and Plott study predict single-valued bidding 
strategies as functions of the private value. The econometrics model used in the Chen and 
Plott paper is artificially constructed by adding a normally distributed error to the Nash 
bidding strategy. The variance of this error is independent .of the value and the bid. On the 
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other hand, the rational novice model explicitly characterizes the distribution of bids. It is 
the goal of this paper to determine whether a distribution of bids based on theory (the 
rational novice model) can perform better than an arbitrary distribution assigned solely for 
the sake of fitting errors. In this section, the rational novice model is estimated and 
compared to the results in the Chen and Plott paper. The rational novice model is found to 
be a better model than the Nash model. Since a visual inspection of the data will show that 
the sizes of the errors change with the value (usually increasing in the value), the reason 
that the rational novice model does better may be that the additional statistical 
assumptions in the Chen and Plott model are inadequate. 
The maximum likelihood technique is used to estimate all the relevant models. The 
observations are in the form {(v;,b;}:i=I...n} where (vi,bJ is the observed value and bid 
of a subject in an experimental auction. Given the parameter y, section 5.4 has outlined a 
method to compute the numerical solution for the corresponding rational novice 
equilibrium by solving equation (5.6) and (5 .7). The rational novice model is estimated by 
the following maximum likelihood procedures. 
For each value of y , the likelihood function can be calculated by: 
1) applying the technique in section 5.4 to solve for a equilibrium (i.e., calculating G(b) for 
each possible b,) and 
2) calculating the log likelihood function by 
(5.8) l(y)=:iJog("P;: ), where p~~ is calculated by equation (5.6). 
o=l 
The Golden Section Search method is then used to find the value of y that gives 
the maximum of the log likelihood function. y is estimated from the Chen and Plott 
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nonlinear first price auction experiments. The results of the estimation are listed in Table 
4 . The rational novice model characterized by p~ only allows bids in the range from 0 to v-
1. The model is unable to explain bids greater than or equal to the private value. In theory, 
this restriction does not pose a conflict with the Nash models since bidding the private 
value is always a dominated strategy. However, in practice we do observe people bidding 
their value or sometimes even above that. In the experiment, there are a few instances that 
the subjects bid greater than or equal to their private values. Those data are ignored in the 
estimation procedures. 
In the Chen and Plott study, five models are estimated and compared to the 
CRRAM. They are the two Nash models (RNNE and RASNE as described in section 
5 .2. I) and three ad hoc rules of thumb. The three rules of thumb are: 
1) The Markdown Model (MM) in which the bid=factor x private value. 
2) The Simple Ad hoc Model (SIMAM) in which the bid is a linear function of the private 
value. And, 
3) The Sophisticated Ad hoc Model (SOPAM) in which the bid is a piece wise linear 
function of the private value in the form: 
b .d . { a+l3value 1 =bid= 
a+ [3value + y( value - 500) if 
v <500 
500:5 v· 
The two Nash models are shown to be inferior to the CRRAM. Therefore, they will be 
ignored in the analysis. The rest of the models, CRRAM, MM, SIMAM and SOP AM, are 
compared to the rational novice model. 
All of the above behavioral model can be generalized into the form: bid=f(value). 
Given the data set { (vI I b; ): i = I ... n}, the econometrics model ·estimated is : 
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b. =f(v.)+£. 
I I I 
where Ei are independent and normally distributed with mean zero. The appropriate 
parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. Since a number of data 
points are ignored in the estimation of the rational novice model, the same group of data is 
ignored in the estimation of the Chen and Plott models. 
As in the Chen and Plott study and the last chapter, Young's Model Selection Test 
was used to compare the other models to the rational novice model. Recall that the 
Young's Selection Test is defined as follows: 
Let us consider the general case where one wants to compare two nonnested models f and 
g. Let I ~ be the maximum log likelihood of data point t under the model f and I ~ be the 
maximum log likelihood of data point t under the model g. Let T be the number of data 
points. Define : 
LR=L(I~ -In , and 
I 
w2 = ~ ""(Ir -ls)2 -(~ LR)2 
T""" I I T .:. 
l 
Consider the foliowing three hypotheses: 
H 0 : f and g are equivalent, 
H r : f is better than g, and 
H~ : g is better than f. 
Young's theorem 5.2 states that 
LR 
a) under H 0 : ..ffw ---+ n(O, I ) 
LR b) under H r : ..ffw ---+ +oo 
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LR 
c) under HG : .Jfw ~ -oo 
The above theorem provides a simple directional test for model selection. Choose 
a critical value c determined by the desirable significance level. Calculate the statistics 
..J;;'w . If ..J;;'w s; lei, one cannot discriminate between f and g. If ..J;;'w >c, one rejects the 
null hypothesis that the models are equivalent in favor of f. If ..J;;'w <-c, then one chooses g 
rejecting the same null hypothesis. 
Young's Selection Test does not take into account the complexity of the models. 
However, there is an additive correction factor that compensates for that. Let m be the 
number of parameters in model f and n be the number of parameters in model g. The 
correction factor used in the Chen and Plott study is K(n,m,T)=(m-n)log(T)/2. The revised 
Young statistics is ..J;;'w +K(n,m,T). As one can see, the correction factor K(n,m,T) adjusts 
the Young statistics in favor of the less complicated model. For example, if model g has 
more parameters than f (i.e., m>n), then the Young statistics are corrected in the favor off 
(K(n,m,T)>O). 
It was shown in Young's paper that a number of different correction factors are all 
asymptotically equivalent. Furthermore, they were all shown to be equivalent to not 
applying a correction factor. Hence, there is no method to choose a correction scheme 
optimally. For consistency, the correction factor used in the Chen and Plott study is 
employed here. The results both with and without the application of this correction factor 
are reported. 
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Young's Selection Test was performed at two levels. The test was performed on 
the pooled data of all six experiments to determine what is the best overall model. The test 
was also performed on individual experiments so that we can find out if difference 
experimental conditions will affect the relative performances of the models. 
5.6 Data Analysis: Results 
The techniques discussed in the previous section were used to estimate the rational 
novice model for the six experiments conducted in the Chen and Plott study. The estimates 
of the log likelihood function suggest that the rational novice model is a better overall 
model than the CRRAM. 
Table 4 reports all the relevant statistics of the six Chen and Plott experiments. The 
first three rows contain the parameters of the experiments. Parameter a and the offset are 
explained in the previous section. A number of data points were ignored in the estimation. 
(The reason is also explained in the previous section.) The amount of data ignored are 
reported in row 4. Recall that y = 2acr2T . Both y and y rr are reported in table 4 . The 
estimates of y rr provide a sense of how risk averse the subjects are. Also reported are the 
log likelihood and the Young statistics of all the models. The Young statistics are 
calculated with respect to the rational novice model. If the statistics are greater than 1.65, 
then the Young test chooses the rational novice model over the other one. If the statistics 
are smaller than -1.65, then the Young test chooses the other model. If the absolute value 
of the statistics is less than 1.65, then the Young test cannot distinguish between the 
rational novice model and the other model. The Young statistics with the correction factor 
(n-m)log(T)/2 are also reported. This correction factor is also explained in the previous 
section. 
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The following summarizes the important results. 
Result 1: The rational novice model is a better overall model than the CRRAM. 
Support: In the pooled data set, the CRRAM can be rejected at five percent significance in 
favor of the rational novice model independent of whether the correction factor K(n,m,T) 
is applied. 
Result 1 alone will indicate that the rational novice is a better model than the 
CRRAM. However, if the test is carried out on individual experimental sessions, the result 
is less clear. 
Result 2: In the six experiments, the rational novice model sometimes performs better than 
the CRRAM and sometimes does not. 
Support: In two out of the six experiments, the CRRAM can be rejected at five percent 
significance in favor of the rational novice model. In the other two experiments, the 
rational novice model can be rejected at five percent significance in favor of the CRRAM. 
In the remaining experiments, the two models are not distinguishable. 
The first result indicates that the rational novice model explains the data better 
than the CRRAM. Even with the less unambiguous result 2, the rational novice model 
seems to provide as much explanatory power as the CRRAM. This is quite remarkable 
considering the fact that the rational novice model is a one parameter model while the 
CRRAM has twelve. 
Result 3: The rational novice model is a better model than the MM. 
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Support: In the pooled data set and four out of the six individual experimental sessions, 
the MM can be rejected at five percent significance in favor of the rational novice model. 
In the remaining two experiments, the Young Model Selection Test chooses MM over the 
rational novice model in one experiment and cannot distinguish the two in another. The 
correction factor does not affect this result. 
The third result should come at no surprise. In the Chen and Plott study, it is 
shown that MM is not as good as the CRRAM. Since result I and 2 have already shown 
that the rational novice model performs as well as the CRRAM, it should do better than 
MM. 
Result 4: The rational novice model is a better model than the SIMAM. 
Support: In the pooled data set and two out of the six individual experimental sessions, the 
SIMAM can be rejected at five percent significance in favor of the rational novice model. 
In the remaining four experiments, the Young Model Selection Test chooses MM over the 
rational novice model in one experiment and cannot distinguish the two in the others. If 
the correction factor is applied, then the SIMAM can be rejected in four of the six 
experiments as well as the pooled data set. 
There is still some ambiguity since the rational novice model does not outperform 
the SIMAM in all experiments. However, considering the fact that the rational novice 
model does better in most experiments (with correction factor applied) and in the pooled 
data set, it would seem that it is the better model. Similarly, the CRRAM is shown to be 
marginally better than the SIMAM in the Chen and Plott study. Thus there is no surprise 
since the performance of the rational novice model is close to that of the CRRAM Notice 
that SIMAM has 24 parameters while the rational novice model only has one. 
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Result 5: The rational novice model may be not good a model as the SOP AM. 
Support: In two out of the six experiments, the SOP AM can be rejected at five percent 
significance in favor of the rational novice model. In the other four, the test chooses the 
SOP AM. If a correction factor is applied, then the Young test only chooses SOPAM over 
the rational novice model in three experiments and cannot distinguish between the two in 
the remaining one. In the pooled data set, the SOP AM is chosen if no correction factor is 
applied. Otherwise, the rational novice model is chosen. 
Result 5 is very ambiguous. If one considers the pooled data set, then the result 
depends on the application of the correction factor. Otherwise, the SOPAM explains the 
data better than the rational novice model in most but not all experiments. In experiment 5 
and 6, the rational novice model does better. 
Although SOP AM has no theoretical foundation, it explains the data better than 
the CRRAM. It seems that people may, after all, follow some sophisticated ad hoc rule of 
thumb than behaving rationally. The SOPAM has 36 parameters. The CRRAM has 12 and 
the rational novice model has one. Even without the application of a correction factor that 
penalizes high number of parameters, the Young Model Selection Test rejects the SOP AM 
in favor of the rational novice model in two experiments. So if one only considers that two 
experiments or the pooled data set with a correction factor, one may conclude that people 
are more likely to behave in some rational ways than just acting on rules of thumb. 
On the other hand, the SOP AM provides a better explanation in four of the six 
experiments. It is frustrating that one cannot find a coherent picture. There are two 
possible explanations of this confusing result. Since the Young Selection Test is only 
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asymptotically consistent, we may not have enough data to distinguish between the two 
models. Furthermore, since a number of different correction factors are asymptotically 
equivalent, with a finite number of data points, our choice of the correction factor may be 
over or under compensating for the complexity of the model. When the difference between 
two models is large (such as the difference between the MM and the rational novice 
model), these factors may not manifest themselves. 
5. 7 Summary and Comments 
This research applies the rational novice model to the first price sealed bid auction. 
Auctions have been a well-studied subject in both the fields of theoretical modeling and 
the experimental studies. In a previous experimental study of nonlinear bidding behavior 
(Chen and Plott), it was found that "people do not exhibit the full extent of the kind of 
rationality that game theory assumes. The CRRAM is not as accurate as the SOP AM nor 
is the rational expectation hypothesis supported by the data." 
The goal of this study is to develop and apply an alternate way of game theory 
modeling that does not require a very high degree of rationality. The rational novice 
equilibrium is proposed as this alternate approach. It is likely that the rational novice 
model will offer a better fit of the data since it does not have to make a wild guess at the 
distribution of the bids. 
The rational novice model takes into account rationality as well as the potential of 
making mistakes. Nash models assume a very high degree of rationality. Since the data do 
not indicate the full extent of rational behavior, it is more likely that in addition to rational 
deduction, there are some other unknown phenomena going on. The rational novice model 
offers a better explanation. The agents are modeled with the ability of rational deduction 
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as well as the capability of responding to mistakes. The comparative statics show that 
when the agents are more risk averse, they are likely to increase their bids as well as 
increase the size of their bid spreads. The first deduction is consistent with Nash models. 
The second is a new result that tells a better story. The rational novice model is a model 
not only capable of predicting the average bids, but also able to characterize the 
distribution of the bid spread. 
Merely characterizing the distribution of the bid spread will not be of any value if 
such characterization is not supported by empirical analysis. Results I through 5 reported 
in section 5 show the rational novice model also provides a better empirical fit to data 
gathered in the Chen and Plott study than the MM and the SIMAM. It is likely that the 
rational novice model performs better than the CRRAM but the evidence is inconclusive. 
In the case of the SOP AM, the rational novice does not seem to do as well. But again, the 
evidence is inconclusive. 
In summary, the rational novice model is applied to the first price private value 
auction in this research. The results suggest that the rational novice model is likely to be 
more accurate than any Nash model (in particular, the CRRAM) as well as a number of ad 
hoc rules-of-thumb. However, the most sophisticated ad hoc model (SOP AM) seems to be 
a better model than the rational novice model. If one accepts the rational novice model as 
a possible explanation, then one would expect people not to exhibit the full extent of the 
kind of optimal behavior described by game theory, neither are they behaving in some 
random way without a discernible pattern. The rational novice model seems to have struck 
the appropriate middle ground between rational and irrational behavior and provides a 
good explanation of people's behavior. 
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There are three possible directions of future research. The first is to gather more 
data and find out whether the models can be better separated from one another. The 
second is to test if the rational novice model performs well in different games. This 
approach involves the application of the existing rational novice framework to other 
games. The third direction is to expand the theoretical framework of the rational novice 
model. For example, the rational novice framework can be expanded to handle extensive 
form games, imperfect perception or a number of other features which are not included in 
the present framework. One important such feature is learning which is not addressed in 
the rational novice model. Although multiple games are played, they are assumed to be 
played simultaneously. In actual life or in experiments, most often games are played 
sequentially and often people learn. One possible way to model learning is to assume 
people play sequential segments of simultaneous games and model the error structure as a 
function of the time specific segment. 
73 
References 
Robert J. Aumann, "An Elementary Proof That Integration Preserves 
Uppersemicontinuity ," Journal of Mathematical Economics 3 (1976) 15-18. 
C. Castaing and M. Valadier, "Convex Analysis and Measurable Multifunctions," 1977, 
volume 580 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Kayyut Chen and Charles R. Plott, "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price 
Auctions," Social Science Working Paper 774, September 1992, California Institute of 
Technology. 
J. Harsanyi and R. Selten, "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection m Games," 
Gambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988. 
R. Mark, Isaac James M. Walker, and Susan H. Thomas. 1984. "Divergent Evidence on 
Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Exlanations." Public Choice Vol. 
43: pp.113-149. 
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey, "An Experimental Study of the Centipede 
Game," Econometrica, 60,803-836 
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey, "Quanta! Response Equilibria for Normal 
Form Games," Social Science Working Paper 883, March 1994, California Institute of 
Technology. 
74 
Thomas R. Palfrey and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, "Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods 
Experiments: How Much and Why?" September 1992 
R. Rosenthal, "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," 
International Journal of Game Theory, 18 ( 1989):273-92. 
Saijo, T . and Y. Yamaguchi. 1992. "The 'Spite' Dilemma in Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism Experiments." 
David R. Schmidt, "Reputation Building By Error Prone Agents," October 1992 
V. Strassen, "The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals," Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics 36:423-439 
Quang H. Young, "Likelihood Ratio Tests For Model Selection And Nonnested 
Hypothesis" Econometrica 57: no. 2, pp. 307-334. March 1989. 
75 
Table 1: Log Likelihood Estimations of Voluntary Contribution Games 
Model Jog likelihood parameter estimates 
Rational novice -800.8 u =-3.26 
(whole data set (j =3.30 
N=773) z=l .67 
Rational novice -260.8 u =-4.72 
(first 5 periods (j =3.25 
discarded z=0.035 
N=437) 
Pro bit -2496 constant coef=-1.39 
(whole data set mrs coef=0.81 
N=773) 
Pro bit -1185 constant coef=-1 .88 
(first 5 periods mrs coef= 1.35 
discarded 
N=437) 
Relaxed Nash -19017 u =-25 (constraint) 
(c=25) cr =0 (constraint) 
N=773 z=O 
The total number of data points in the whole data set = 1280. 
The total number of data points with first 5 periods discarded = 640. 
The estimation of the rational novice model requires independence across data points. 
Some subjects received the same (private good value, public good value) pair more than 
once in an experiment. The rational novice model does not guarantee these decisions to be 
independent of each other. These data are discarded. 
The number of data points after discarding the dependent data= 773. 
The number of data points after discarding the dependent data and the first 5 periods = 
437. 
Since the Probit model is a discrete choice model while the rational novice model is a 
continuous model, the relative performance of the models can not be determined by 
comparing the log likelihoods of the two. 
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Table 2 : Test Statistics of Voluntary Contribution Games 
Model Test statistics parameters constraint 
tested 
Rational novice 36432* u =-25 
VS (p-value= 1.00) (j =0 
Relaxed Nash 
(c=25) 
The models are tested against the hypothesis that the Nash model is true. 
A* indicates that the Nash equilibrium can be rejected at five percent significance. 
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Table 3: Pseudo R2 Statistics for Voluntary Contribution Games 
Model Pseudo R2 
Rational novice 0 .67 
(whole data set) 
Rational novice 0.75 
(first 5 periods 
discarded) 
Pro bit 0.57 
(whole data set) 
Pro bit 0.68 
(first 5 periods 
discarded) 
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Table 4: Log Likelihood Estimation and Voung's Statistics in First Price Auctions 
Experiment 
I 2 3 4 5 6 pooled 
Number of 60 120 70 100 100 100 
Periods (T) 
Parameter a 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.8 
Offset 0 0 500 500 0 500 
Number of 17 38 57 39 13 100 264 
Data Points (2.36%) (2.64%) (6.79%) (3.25%) (1.08%) (8.33%) 
Discarded 
(percentage) 
Number of 703 1362 783 1161 1187 1100 6296 
Data Points 
Used 
Estimate of 1.905441 2.423428 2.055558 2.557898 2.155390 1.813302 
-
y in 
rational 
novice 
model 
<r ro 0.0318 0.0202 0.0293 0.0256 0.0216 0.0181 
Likelihood 
Estimates 
Rational -3512 -7236 -4202 -6542 -5913 
-5523 -32928 
novice -3300 -7232 -4158 -6376 -6344 
-5901 -33311 
CRRAM -3666 -7289 -4295 -6362 -6358 
-5979 -33949 
MM -3548 -7207 -4209 -6303 -6309 
-5908 -33484 
SIMAM -3100 -7035 -3961 -6227 -6220 
-5758 -32301 
SOP AM 
w 
CRRAM 44.48 60.10 38.91 60.14 74.86 51.36 58.10 
MM 50.49 69.43 56.04 57.85 73.10 55.59 62.31 
SIMAM 45.48 60.09 41.63 60.06 78.51 51.59 59.33 
SOP AM 64.87 74.10 49.94 61.31 73.99 57.57 65.36 
Young's 
Statistics 
CRRAM -4.76 -0.05 - 1.12 -2.76 5.76 7.37 6.59 
MM 3.06 0.77 1.66 -3.12 6.08 8.21 16.39 
SIMAM 0.81 -0.48 0.16 -3.98 5.04 7.47 9.37 
SOP AM -6.34 --2.71 -4.83 -5.14 4.15 4.09 -9.59 
Young's 
Statistics w/ 
correction* 
CRRAM -3.95 -0.61 -0.18 -2.12 6.28 8.12 11.56 
MM 3.78 1.34 2.31 -2.45 6.61 8.90 21.02 
SIMAM 2.47 0.90 2.00 -2.63 6.08 9.03 19.54 
SOP AM -4.57 -1.00 -2.49 -3.13 . 5.82 6.21 4.46 
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* The correction factor for Young's Statistics is K(n,m,T)=(n-m)log(T)/2 where n=number 
of parameters in the other model, m=number of parameters in the rational novice model 
and T=number of data points. 
When the Young Test is conducted at five percent significance, the critical value of the 
statistics is 1.65. That is, if the statistics is > 1.65, the other model is rejected in favor of 
the rational novice model. If the statistics is <-1.65, the rational novice model is rejected in 
favor of the other model. If the statistics is between -1.65 and 1.65, then the rational 
novice model is indistinguishable from the other model given the data. 
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figure 3: Distribution of Errors (whole data set) 
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figure 4: Distribution of Errors (first 5 periods discarded) 
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